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REVELATION AND REACTION: THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION 
By 




Recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court implicate important 
conclusions about the respective domains of courts of law and arbitration 
tribunals regarding so-called “gateway” determinations surrounding the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements and the contracts of which they are a 
part.1 They address the complex interplay between federal substantive law 
focusing on questions of arbitrability, a body of law defined and expanded 
                                                 
* William H. Webster Chair in Dispute Resolution, Professor of Law, Pepperdine 
University School of Law; Academic Director, Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution. The 
author is grateful for the support and assistance provided by the London office of 
WilmerHale, including Gary Born, Dr. Maxi Scherer, Jeremie Kohn, Library and 
Information Services Manager Sally Charin, and legal interns Nausheen Rahman and Sadie 
Blanchard during the author’s tenure as WilmerHale Scholar-in-Residence (Fall 2010). The 
author wishes to thank his valued colleague Gina McCoy, Research Librarian at 
Pepperdine School of Law, and Pepperdine law students Chris Herring, Daniel Lockwood, 
Li Meng, Maxfield Marquardt and Sara Rosenblit, all of whom assisted with research for 
this paper. Finally, he thanks Tom Carbonneau and other participants in the Penn State 
Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation 2011 Symposium: The Arbitrator as Judge . . . and 
Judge of Jurisdiction, as well as participants in the Fordham International Arbitration 
Symposium for their comments and reflections. Unless otherwise noted, of course, the 
observations and conclusions are the author’s own. © Thomas J. Stipanowich (2010).  
1 In terms of judicial activism the present period is reminiscent of the early 1960s and the 
groundbreaking “Steelworker’s Trilogy” of labor arbitration precedents. See United 
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior 
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel 
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). It builds directly upon a series of decisions from 
another very active period, the mid-1980s, which ushered in a long (and continuing) period 
of pro-arbitration jurisprudence characterized by expansive interpretations of the FAA. At 
that time the Supreme Court, reinterpreting congressional intent, found that the FAA 
created a broad national policy favoring arbitration when parties choose it. See generally 
Linda R. Hirschman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration 
Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985) (discussing the broad reach of the FAA resulting from 
pro-arbitration Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
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by the Court under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the law of the 
states. They bring into play competing judicial philosophies of contractual 
assent and contrasting views about the balance between policies promoting 
the autonomy of contracting parties and judicial policing of overreaching in 
the context of contracts of adhesion.        
The Court’s decisions reflect the extreme pro-arbitration slant of 
recent decades while etching in sharp relief the fault lines that divide the 
factions of the Court and the broader American political landscape.2 The 
Court’s current jurisprudence, which may be seen as establishing and 
expanding a “second tier” of the “revealed” substantive law of arbitrability 
under the FAA first given shape and substance in the 1980s,3 is a flashpoint 
for special concerns associated with standardized contracts directing 
consumers and employees into arbitration. It will inevitably add momentum 
to current efforts to enact national legislation outlawing pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements in consumer, employment and other classes of 
contracts, with possible negative consequences for business-to-business 
arbitration.   
Part II of this article sets the stage for the discussion of recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence with a short history of the evolution through 
Court decisions of the “revelation” and expansion of federal substantive law 
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Parts III and IV discuss recent 
Supreme Court cases reflecting the Court’s continuing reliance on this 
seemingly inexhaustible wellspring of divined federal law as a basis for 
promoting party autonomy in arbitration while limiting lower courts’ ability 
                                                 
2 See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging 
and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (2008) (discussing 
judicial manipulation of arbitration doctrine and the cause-and-effect relationships of 
courts, legislatures and other groups within a dynamic system).      
3 Hirschman, supra note 1, at 1322-24, 1329-53. 
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to police such agreements. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International,4 
set against the backdrop of an international commercial contract scheme and 
an unusual procedural scenario, limits the ability of arbitrators—or courts—
to promote public policies supporting class actions.5 (Some have read Stolt-
Nielsen as a portent of the Court’s likely curtailment of state-law-based 
policies against enforcement of contractual waivers of the ability to 
participate in a class action when coupled with an agreement to arbitrate.6) 
In Rent-A-Center, West v. Jackson,7 entrenched doctrine supporting the 
separability of arbitration agreements from the contracts of which they are a 
part for the purposes of enforcement under the FAA and the evolving body 
of precedents addressing contractual allocation of different decisions at the 
“gateway” to arbitration (including issues of the breadth or scope of an 
arbitration agreement as well as issues relating to the existence, validity or 
enforceability of agreements) are in tension with the authority of courts to 
deny or limit the enforcement of arbitration agreements "upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract" under the 
rubric of unconscionability.8 Once again, the Court discerns Federal 
substantive law surrounding the FAA—this time as a basis for a novel 
variation of the separability principle, an aggressive application of court 
precedents transferring from courts to arbitrators authority to resolve 
                                                 
4 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
5 The class action is a distinctively U.S. phenomenon. It establishes a framework for 
bringing a legal cause of action on behalf of a large group of people, or for suit against a 
group or class of defendants. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP 
LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987). 
6 See, e.g., Richard Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class 
Action, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming) (Vanderbilt Pub. Law Res. Paper No. 10-34, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670722); Karen Halverson Cross, Letting the 
Arbitrator Decide Unconscionability Challenges, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1552966. 
7 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
8 Perry v. Thomas, 482 US 483, 489, 492 n.9 (1987). 
ARBITRATOR AS JUDGE… AND JUDGE OF JURISDICTION SYMPOSIUM 
   
128 
enforceability issues, and segregating the determination a contract has been 
“made” in a formalistic sense from consideration of defenses to its 
enforceability and validity.   
Part V briefly explores the dynamic political response to the 
extreme, non-nuanced pro-arbitration position developed in modern Court 
jurisprudence. After many years in which Congressional inaction has 
provided a vacuum giving maximum play to the Court’s expansive 
interpretations of the FAA, Congress and the Executive have begun to move 
forcefully across a broad front. However, these responses have also tended 
to suffer from over breadth and lack of nuance, with potentially undesirable 
consequences for commercial arbitration domestically and internationally.      
The article concludes by calling for carefully crafted legislation or 
administrative regulations limiting the use of arbitration agreements in 
adhesion contracts or establishing due process standards for such 
agreements. It suggests that process choices should be informed by 
dispassionate consideration of the systemic costs and benefits of public and 
private approaches, and should avoid unnecessary transaction costs in the 
broad realm of business-to-business transactions, especially international 
transactions. The result may not be a single solution, but rather several 
approaches reflecting the different realities of discrete transactional 
systems.       
 
II.    THE WELLSPRING: FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE LAW UNDER THE FAA 
AND ITS PREEMPTIVE EFFECT  
 
The current spate of Supreme Court decisions must be understood in the 
context of the quarter century of case law interpreting and expanding the umbrella 
of the FAA and the associated penumbra of “substantive federal law.” In the mid-
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1980s, the Supreme Court declared the FAA to be a source of “federal substantive 
law of arbitrability.”9 An evocation of Congress’ power under the Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution,10 the FAA comes into play whenever arbitration 
agreements arise in the context of transactions involving interstate commerce—a 
truly broad mandate.11 By identifying the FAA as a source of federal substantive 
law governing issues of arbitrability, the Supreme Court established its 
applicability in state as well as federal courts,12 as well as its power to preempt 
contrary state law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.13 In 
Southland Corp. v. Keating,14 the Court held that FAA Section 215 preempted a 
provision of the California Franchise Investment Law that California courts had 
interpreted to require judicial consideration (as opposed to arbitration) of claims 
arising under that statute. The Court explained, “In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, 
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration, and withdrew the power 
of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the 
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”16 Further, “Congress intended 
to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration 
                                                 
9 In Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) the Court 
stated, “Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the 
contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law of 
arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.” 
10 Perry, 482 U.S. at 489 (“The Federal Arbitration Act... embodies Congress' intent to 
provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the 
Commerce Clause”).   
11 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-78 (1995). 
12 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984). 
13 U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; Perry, 482 U.S. at 489-92.   
14 Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).   
15 9 U.S.C. § 2 (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out 
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or 
an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such 
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”). 
16 Keating, 465 U.S. at 10.    
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agreements.”17 In the years since Southland the Court has repeatedly asserted 
strong pro-arbitration policies under the FAA to enforce arbitration of a wide 
spectrum of claims and controversies under federal and state statutes,18 
confounding the efforts of state legislatures to prohibit or limit the enforceability 
of arbitration agreements in transactions involving interstate commerce.19 In 
contrast to the traditional, highly skeptical view of arbitration as a surrogate for 
trial embraced in earlier decisions,20 modern Court decision rigorously adhere to 
the concept of arbitration as a facially acceptable substitute for a public tribunal. In 
the words of the Court, “By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not 
forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it merely submits their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.”21 
                                                 
17 Id. at 16.  
18 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616, 640 
(1985), the Court ruled that claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act were arbitrable under 
the FAA. The Court reasoned that the arbitral forum provided distinct advantages for many 
parties: ‘‘[Arbitration] trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom 
for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.’’ Id. at 628. Two years later 
the Court held that statutory claims arising under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) are subject to mandatory arbitration. See Shearson/American 
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (finding no basis for concluding that 
Congress intended to prevent enforcement of agreements to arbitrate RICO claims and 
concluding that a RICO claim can be effectively vindicated in an arbitral forum). 
McMahon also held that claims under the Securities Act of 1934 are subject to binding 
arbitration, rejecting the reasoning of Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953), which held 
that claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 were not subject to binding arbitration. 
Not surprisingly, the Court overruled Wilko two years later in Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991), supporting the arbitrability of statutory employment 
discrimination claims, narrowed the so-called ‘‘public policy’’ limitation even further. 
19 See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1996) (enforcing 
arbitration agreement in franchise contract, holding FAA preemptive of Montana state law 
purporting to regulate the form of arbitration agreements); Bruhl, supra note 2, at 1426-32 
(describing Court-directed expansion of FAA).  
20 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 US 427, 435-38 (1953). 
21 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. More recently the Court observed that “[t]he decision to 
resolve [statutory claims relating to employment discrimination] by way of arbitration 
instead of litigation does not waive the statutory right to be free from workplace age 
discrimination; it waives only the right to seek relief from court in the first instance.” 14 
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1459 (2009).   
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As interpreted by the Court, the FAA Section 2’s “clear federal policy” 
required arbitration of disputes falling within the ambit of the statute, save "upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."22 As 
we will see, in recent decisions the Court has used the vehicle of federal 
substantive arbitration law to severely limit the purview of judicial oversight under 
Section 2 and related provisions of the FAA. There is an abiding tension between 
the Court’s staunch, expansive pro-arbitration jurisprudence under the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) and concerns about the impact of various terms in 
arbitration agreements featured in “contracts of adhesion”23--typically non-
negotiated standardized contracts for consumer sales or service or employment 
agreements.  
 
III. STOLT-NIELSEN S.A. V. ANIMALFEEDS INTERNATIONAL: BACK TO 
THE WELL 
 
A. History of the Case 
 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International24 involved 
commercial parties unquestionably outside the realm of contractual 
adhesion, and, even more curiously, a post-dispute, one-off submission to 
arbitration. AnimalFeeds shipped goods under a standard "charter party" 
contract that contained an arbitration clause. AnimalFeeds subsequently 
brought a class action law suit against Stolt-Nielsen SA and other shipping 
companies on the basis that they were engaged in an illegal price-fixing 
                                                 
22 Perry, 482 U.S. at 489.    
23 See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay on Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1173, 1265-66 (1983) (discussing elements of adhesion contracts), discussed infra 
note 48.   
24 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).  
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conspiracy.25 The suit was consolidated with similar suits brought by other 
charterers, including one in which the Second Circuit overturned a district 
court ruling that the charterers' actions were not subject to arbitration.26 The 
parties subsequently agreed that as a consequence of these orders, they were 
required to arbitrate. AnimalFeeds then served Stolt-Nielsen and the other 
defendants with a demand for class arbitration. The parties entered into a 
supplemental agreement to submit the [question of class arbitration] to a 
panel of three arbitrators who were to address the question under the 
American Arbitration Association's Supplementary Rules for Class 
Arbitrations (which were developed in the wake of the Court's earlier 
decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle27). The parties stipulated 
that the arbitration clause was "silent" with respect to class arbitration.28 
After hearing arguments and evidence, including expert testimony on 
customs and usage in the maritime trade, the arbitration panel ruled that the 
language in the charter party permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed with "class 
arbitration." The panel found it persuasive that, post-Bazzle, other 
arbitrators had construed "a wide variety of clauses in a wide variety of 
                                                 
25 The litigation had begun with a number of suits brought after the defendant shippers 
were found by a Justice Department investigation to have engaged in an illegal conspiracy 
to fix prices. See Sherman Kahn, Developments in Arbitration: Arbitration at the United 




26 See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765; JLM Indus., v. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A., 387 F.3d 163, 
183 (2004). 
27 539 U.S. 444 (2003).   
28 Furthermore, counsel for AnimalFeeds told the arbitration panel that "[a]ll the parties 
agree that when a contract is silent on an issue there's been no agreement that has been 
reached on that issue." Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1766. 
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settings as allowing for class arbitration." Moreover, the defendants had 
failed to show an "inten[t] to preclude class arbitration."29   
The arbitrators stayed the arbitration proceeding to allow the parties 
to seek judicial review. The defendants then filed a petition in district court 
to vacate the panel's determination under Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) (authorizing a court to vacate an award on motion 
"where the arbitrators exceeded their powers").30   
The district court vacated the award on the basis that the arbitrators' 
decision was made in "manifest disregard" of the law since they failed to 
address the question of choice of law prior to rendering their decision. 
AnimalFeeds appealed to the Second Circuit, which reversed, holding that 
although the "manifest disregard" standard had indeed survived the 
Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,31 
as a "judicial gloss" on the statutory grounds for vacatur provided by the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the arbitrators' decision was not in 
"manifest disregard" of federal maritime law or New York law, since in 
                                                 
29 Id. at 1775. 
30 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 
31 In Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008), Justice Souter's 
opinion, joined by five other justices, declared that the grounds for judicial review of 
arbitration awards set forth in §§ 10–11 of the FAA are the exclusive sources of judicial 
review under that statute. In reaching this conclusion, the Court majority spoke to the 
much-cited dictum in a 1953 decision, Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), and declined 
to read its reference "manifest disregard of the law" as creating an independent, judicially-
declared basis for vacatur outside the precise terms of FAA §§ 10–11. The High Court did 
not, however, deal a death blow to "manifest disregard" under the FAA, since a lower court 
may read the decision as authorizing such inquiries under the specific terms of the FAA. 
The Court was not clear about whether there is still room for "manifest disregard" under 
the specific terms of the FAA, notably § 10(a)(4). The Court briefly noted, without 
comment, that "some courts have thought . . . 'manifest disregard' may have been shorthand 
for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4)"; 128 S.Ct. at 1404, and cited the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 540 U.S. 1098 (2004). In the wake of 
Hall Street, some courts have continued to apply the principle with or without reference to 
Hall Street. Other courts interpreted the Hall Street decision as eliminating the principle in 
cases under the FAA.  
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neither case was there legal authority establishing a rule against class 
arbitration.   
 
B. The Court’s Decision: Grounding in Federal Substantive Law  
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, heard arguments and 
rendered a decision reversing the judgment of the Second Circuit. A five-
member majority comprised of Justices Alito, Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia and 
Thomas joined in an opinion crafted by Justice Alito. The thrust of the 
majority opinion is to shun the rationale of the Bazzle plurality—which had 
characterized the question of whether class arbitration is appropriate as a 
matter of "procedure" growing out of the dispute.32 Instead, the majority 
grounds its decision on Supreme Court "precedents [under the FAA] 
emphasizing the consensual basis of arbitration."33 The majority thus brings 
into play the body of substantive law of arbitrability that has grown up 
around the FAA in the last quarter-century—and which preempts contrary 
state law.34 The majority explains that "[w]hile the interpretation of an 
arbitration agreement is generally a matter of state law, . . . the FAA 
imposes certain rules of fundamental importance, including the basic 
precept that arbitration "is a matter of consent, not coercion."35 The 
contractual foundation of arbitration facilitates party choices—including 
"who will resolve specific disputes," and "with whom they choose to 
                                                 
32 See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1770, 1772; Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 
444, 451-53 (2003). 
33 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776.  
34 See supra notes 9-22. 
35 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773 (quoting Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)). 
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arbitrate."36 Here, where the parties' agreement was silent as to the issue of 
class-action arbitration—and, indeed, had stipulated that there was "no 
agreement" on the matter—there could be no basis upon which to authorize 
class arbitration. Explained the Court: 
 
[T]he differences between bilateral and class-action 
arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume, 
consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, 
that the parties' mere silence on the issue of class-action 
arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes 
in class proceedings. 37   
  
Such a result could not be inferred "solely from the fact of the parties' 
agreement to arbitrate" because class-action arbitration "changes the nature 
of arbitration" in various ways: (1) the arbitrator is charged with resolving 
not just a single dispute, "but instead resolves many disputes between 
hundreds or . . . thousands of parties"; (2) the "presumption of privacy and 
confidentiality" is lost; (3) the arbitrator's award "adjudicates the rights of 
absent parties"; and (4) the commercial stakes are particularly significant, as 
in class-action litigation.38   
 Thus, the majority concludes that, as a matter of federal law, there 
can be no class-action arbitration when the parties have stipulated there is 
"no agreement" on the matter.39 The present decision arguably fits more 
squarely than Bazzle within the general body of American precedents 
                                                 
36 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774. 
37 Id. at 1776. 
38 Id. at 1775-76. 
39 See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776. 
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involving multi-party conflict and multiple arbitration agreements.40 The 
majority of U.S. courts that considered the question have taken it upon 
themselves to address issues relating to the consolidated arbitration of 
multi-party disputes involving multiple contracts and multiple arbitration 
agreements, and have characterized the key issue as one of consent.41  
 
C. Stolt-Nielsen as Reflective of International Forum Selection Policies 
 
 Although the Court did not address the issue, its decision in Stolt-
Nielsen is in line with the body of precedents reflecting strong receptiveness 
to arbitration provisions as a species of forum selection clauses in 
                                                 
40 See IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, III FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS & REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT, ch. 33 (Little, Brown & Co. ed.,  Aspen Law & Bus. 1999) (1994) 
(discussing federal case law, most of which holds that, absent express agreement, an 
arbitrator does not have authority to expand an action into a class action). 
41 See Gov't of U.K. of Gr. Brit. & N. Ir. v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(quoting Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991)) 
(“‘[A] court is not permitted to interfere with private arbitration arrangements in order to 
impose its own view of speed and economy. . . . If contracting parties wish to have all 
disputes that arise from the same factual situation arbitrated in a single proceeding, they 
can simply provide for consolidated arbitration in the arbitration clauses to which they are a 
party.”); Pac. Reins. Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Reins. Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 
1991) (holding that arbitrator does not have authority add new parties to arbitration 
proceedings without the consent of all parties); Hotel Restaurant Employees Int’l Union v. 
Michelson’s Food Svcs., 545 F.2d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that arbitrators do 
not have the authority to expand an action into a class action). See generally MACNEIL, 
SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 40, ch. 33. The Stolt-Nielsen majority's decision 
clearly seeks to undermine Bazzle—which, the majority concludes, failed to yield a 
majority decision on any of the questions presented.  Bazzle was hardly a model of clarity 
or comfort for anyone; counsel for financial services companies as well as consumer 
counsel have roundly criticized the result. See Brief for Petitioner at 21-23, AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, No. 09-893 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010) (noting risks of class-wide 
arbitration, given the potentially broad consequences of a class-wide arbitration award and 
limited judicial review of awards). One wonders whether Alito and company regard the 
post-Bazzle establishment of procedures to facilitate class action arbitration as a great deal 
of sound and fury ultimately signifying nothing. 
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international contracts.42 Richard Nagareda argues that the Court’s 
downplaying of state policies supporting class action and its 
characterization of the “fundamental changes” that class-wide arbitration 
would bring is consistent with prevailing international practice. U.S.-style 
class actions are “anomalous” among global regimes; the concept of an opt-
out class proceeding is distinctly at odds with civil law precepts that require 
affirmative consent to disposition of claimant’s rights.43 The Stolt-Nielsen 
holding thus avoids potential issues of other nations’ public policy 
applicable to the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards under 
the New York Convention,44 and “effectively eases what otherwise would 
be the potential for tension between the obligation of other nations to 
recognize and enforce arbitral awards under the New York Convention and 
the principles that those same nations would use to recognize and enforce 
judgments in litigation.”45  
 
D. Implications for Adhesion and “Class Action Waiver” Scenarios 
 
There is, however, a very different way of looking at Stolt-Nielsen, 
and that involves its potential implications for judicial treatment of so-
called “waiver of class action” clauses featured in predispute arbitration 
                                                 
42 See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).  See generally, Nagareda, supra 
note 6. 
43 Nagareda, supra note 6, at 29.   
44 Id. at 30; see also Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, [New York Convention], available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/1958NYConvention.pdf 
45 Nagareda, supra note 6, at 30. For a contrary view, see S.I. Strong, The Sounds of 
Silence: Are U.S. Arbitrators Creating Internationally Enforceable Awards When Ordering 
Class Arbitration in Cases of Contractual Silence or Ambiguity, 30 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 
1017, 1083-91 (2009).   
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agreements in many consumer and employment contracts.46 Among the 
“grounds… at law or in equity” recognized by the Court is the doctrine of 
unconscionability.47 The defense of unconscionability has been the 
centerpiece of widespread efforts to avoid arbitration in recent years, 
usually in the context of standardized agreements for employment or 
consumer goods or services that exhibit certain characteristics of contracts 
of adhesion.48 Where a party is found to lack “a meaningful opportunity” to 
bargain, resulting in “unfairly one-sided” terms,49 a federal or state court 
may employ state principles of unconscionability to deny enforcement to all 
                                                 
46 See generally, Alexander J. Casey, Arbitration Nation: Wireless Service Providers and 
Class Arbitration Waivers, 6 WASHINGTON J. LAW, TECH. & ARTS 15 (2010); Yongdam 
Li, Applying the Doctrine of Unconscionability to Employment Arbitration Agreements, 
With Emphasis on Class Arbitration/ Arbitration Waivers, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 665 
(2010);  Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement:  A Balanced 
Legislative Response, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 361 (2010); William H. Baker, Class Action 
Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 335 (2009); Richard M. Alderman, Why 
We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act:  It’s All About Separation of Powers, 12 J. 
OF CONSUMER & COM. L. 151, 154 (2009) (discussing the recent “attack” on consumer 
arbitration by consumer advocates and the “widely criticized” “additional problem... that an 
arbitration clause may preclude the use of the class actions device”); Heather Bromfield, 
The Denial of Relief: The Enforcement of Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements, 
43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 315 (2009); Diana Link & Richard Bales, Waiving Rights 
Goodbye: Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements After Stolt-Nielsen v. 
AnimalFeeds International, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685297.   
47 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) (“Generally applicable 
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate 
arbitration agreements without contravening [FAA] § 2.”); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 15, 22; infra text accompanying notes 121-47.    
48 The leading commentary on adhesion contracts remains Rakoff, supra note 23. Professor 
Rakoff enumerates several identifying elements of contracts of adhesion, to wit: (1) “…a 
printed form that contains many terms and clearly purports to be a contract”; (2) a form 
drafted by one party to the transaction; (3) “[t]he drafting party participates in numerous 
transactions of the type represented…”; (4) the form is presented with the representation 
that “the drafting party will enter into the transaction only on the terms contained in the 
document”; (5) after dickering over whatever terms are open to bargaining, the adhering 
party signs the document; (6) “[t]he adhering party enters into few transactions of the type 
represented by the form”; (7) the principle obligation of the adhering party is to pay money. 
Id. at 1176-80. 
49 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 121-24.   
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or part of an arbitration agreement, or reform the provision.50 Among the 
substantive grounds supporting unconscionability defenses, contractual 
waivers of the right to participate in a class action are among the most 
common;51 they have also produced conflicting rulings by courts.52 Again, 
much—including both the unconscionability determination and the relief 
granted—hinges on the applicable state law.53   
The Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen, while not a direct assault on 
the breastworks of unconscionability and class action waiver doctrine, 
nonetheless laid the siege lines. Though Justice Alito’s opinion stops short 
of "decid[ing] what contractual basis may support a finding that the parties 
agreed to authorize class-action arbitration," it may perceived by some as a 
clear signal of the Court's lack of receptiveness to concerns about the 
impact of arbitration provisions on plaintiffs' ability to bring class actions—
especially since the question may be decided not on the basis of state law 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1219-21 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(applying Washington state law); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893-95 
(9th Cir. 2002) (applying New York state law); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 
655 S.E.2d 362, 369-70, 372-73 (N.C. 2008); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare 
Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 680-90 (Cal. 2000).  See also infra text accompanying notes 126-34.   
51 See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 630-36 (2010).  
52 David Horton, supra note 51, at 634.  See, e.g., Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 
229-32 (3d Cir. 2009) (class action waiver in credit card agreement unconscionable); Chalk 
v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1096-98 (9th Cir. 2009) (class action waiver made 
entire arbitration clause unconscionable since waiver provision was "not severable"); 
Laster v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 854-56, 857-59 (9th Cir. 2009) (class action 
waiver made arbitration clause unconscionable; FAA did not expressly or impliedly 
preempt California law governing unconscionability); Kaneff v. Del. Title Loans, Inc. 587 
F.3d 616, 624-25 (3d Cir. 2009) (arbitration clause in car loan agreement requiring debtor 
to arbitrate all disputes but allowing lender to repossess through court channels or self-help, 
containing class action waiver, provision for sharing of costs, and filing fee was not 
unconscionable under state law); Cicle v. Chase Bank USA, 583 F.3d 549, 555-56 (8th Cir. 
2009) (arbitration clause in credit card agreement containing waiver of class action not 
unconscionable under Missouri law).  
53 See, e.g., Lowden, 512 F.3d at 1219-21 (applying Washington state law); Circuity City 
Stores, 279 F.3d at 893-95 (applying New York State law); Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 369-70, 
372-73; Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 680-90; See also, infra text accompanying notes 126-34. 
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and policy, but on that penumbra of federal law substantive law which the 
Court has found emanating from the FAA. While, as noted above, the Court 
has repeatedly taken the position that federal law is so supportive of 
agreements to arbitrate all kinds of civil disputes that it displaces state law 
that stands in the way of maximal enforcement;54 Stolt-Nielsen appears to 
go further. Alito’s opinion presages a “second tier” of substantive 
arbitrability law under the FAA—a body of law that not only affirmatively 
enforces agreements to arbitrate, but sets federal boundaries regarding the 
nature and scope of consent to arbitrate. Although it is too soon to tell, the 
Alito decision may be taken by some as a hint that the Court is prepared to 
remove the state law- and policy-based underpinnings for decisions 
directing parties to “class action arbitration” in the absence of specific 
contract language providing for such procedures (language which is highly 
unlikely to appear in any agreement55) and perhaps even to preempt state 
precedents deeming contractual provisions purporting to waive class-based 
relief in arbitration unconscionable.56   
The latter concerns, of course, are sharply focused on the context of 
standardized contracts of adhesion, while the present case involved arms-
length bargaining between sophisticated parties.57 Alito alludes to this in a 
footnote criticizing the arbitration panel for relying on "cited arbitration 
awards,” “none of [which] involved a contract between sophisticated 
business entities."58 Justice Ginsberg took note of this qualification, 
                                                 
54 See supra text accompanying notes 9-22.    
55 Nagareda, supra note 6, (“[F]aced with the choice of a class action in court and class 
arbitration, [corporate] defendants’ oft-noted move is to opt for the devil you know...”).   
56 See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 130 S.Ct. 3322 (argued May 24, 2010) (No. 09-893) 
(granting cert. to at last address the issue of class action waivers). 
57 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1764-65 (2010). 
58 Id. at 1768 n.4. 
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concluding that the Court “apparently spares” contracts of adhesion from a 
requirement that consent to class arbitration be expressed affirmatively.59 
Ginsberg and the dissenting justices, moreover, sought to read the Court’s 
holding as requiring “a contractual basis for concluding that the parties 
agreed” to submit disputes to class arbitration, but not necessarily express 
assent.”60    
There is therefore room for surmise about how the Court would 
handle the class-action issue in an adhesion contract setting. Might a 
moderate judge enable a majority of the Court to reason that the 
"consensual dictates" of the FAA give way in any respect to the moderating 
realities of mass contracting, where additional concerns regarding the 
realities of assent come into play?61 The Court will have the opportunity to 
address the issue in the AT&T v. Concepcion62— a decision which with 
Stolt-Nielsen and Rent-A-Center may comprise a Third Arbitration Trilogy.  
Meanwhile, in light of Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court summarily 
vacated and remanded for reconsideration the decision of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
                                                 
59 Id. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
60 Id.  
61 See Richard M. Alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act:  It’s All 
About Separation of Powers, 12 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 151, 154 (2009) (quoting a 
recent dissenting opinion in a Florida arbitration decision: “What we have begun to see is 
that virtually all consumer transactions, no matter the size or type, now contain an 
arbitration clause. And with every reinforcing decision, these clauses become ever more 
brazenly loaded to the detriment of the consumer. . . . Most consumers can’t read them, 
won’t read them, don’t understand them, don’t understand their implication and can’t 
afford counsel to help them out”); William H. Baker, Class Action Arbitration, 10 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 335, 352 (2009) (reviewing recent cases addressing class 
action arbitration and noting the “special considerations” facing consumer contracts “where 
the consumers had no real opportunity to negotiate or change the clauses”). 
62 See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 130 S.Ct. 3322 (argued May 24, 2010) (No. 09-893). 
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Restaurant.63 As in Stolt-Nielsen, the dispute in American Express involves 
commercial parties. A putative class of merchants who accept American 
Express's payment card allege that American Express has breached antitrust 
law in its dealings with the class. However, many of the merchants are 
small businesses with individual claims not exceeding $5,000. Unlike the 
arbitration clause in Stolt-Nielsen, the clause in question in American 
Express did not specifically allocate arbitrability decisions to the arbitrator. 
The Second Circuit—with then-Judge Sotomayor on the panel—
ruled that the question of enforceability of class action waiver provisions in 
arbitration was for the court, rather than the arbitrator, and that enforcing 
the waiver provision would equate to granting American Express de facto 
immunity from federal antitrust liability by precluding the plaintiffs' only 
reasonable means of recovery given their disparate bargaining power.64 
Because the contract in question in American Express bears some of the 
earmarks of a contract of adhesion,65 the Second Circuit may become the 
first U.S. appellate court to apply Stolt-Nielsen to a contract of adhesion 
between businesses. It is likely, however, to have more specific guidance 
from the Court in the form of a decision in A.T.& T. v. Concepcion.66 
 
                                                 
63 Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 554 F.3d 300, (2d Cir. 
2009), vacated and remanded sub nom American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., No. 
08-1473, 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010).  
64 Italian Colors Rest., 554 F.3d at 310-11, 319-20. 
65 See Rakoff, supra note 23 at 1176-78.   
66 Laster, 584 F.3d 849 (cert. granted sub nom AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
(argued May 24, 2010) (No. 09-893)).   
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E. Stolt-Nielsen, Judicial Vacatur of Awards, and Manifest Disregard    
 
Because of the Court’s consistent penchant for enforcing arbitration 
agreements, increasing attention has been paid to the degree of scrutiny 
given by courts to arbitration awards in the course of ruling on motions to 
vacate. In this regard, one final element of Stolt-Nielsen bears comment—
the rare spectacle of the nation's High Court directing vacatur of a 
commercial arbitration award.67 Although, as in Hall Street,68 the Court 
declined to give clear direction on the status of the doctrine of "manifest 
disregard of the law," the majority nevertheless decided that if such a 
standard indeed exists, it was met!69 The arbitration panel failed to consider 
what body of law governed the issue of class arbitration, but instead rested 
its decision on general public policies supporting the concept. Such an 
approach ignored the FAA’s preemptive "consensual foundation"—the 
requirement that no person can be required to arbitrate except as prescribed 
by agreement. The arbitrators’ failure to recognize and adhere to these basic 
principles was an act "in excess of their powers," amounting to "manifest 
disregard" of fundamental FAA precepts. (Justice Ginsberg's dissent, joined 
by Justices Stevens and Breyer, questioned not only the level of scrutiny 
                                                 
67 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (reinforcing 
the perceived breadth of "evident partiality" And giving rise to one of the more popular 
bases for motions to vacate awards and, thereby, an extensive progeny of case decisions on 
conflict of interest and disclosure):  see also IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & 
THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, III FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS & 
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, §40.1.4  (Aspen Law & Business 
1994).   
68 Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
69 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 n.3 (2010). 
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applied by the majority but, moreover, the ripeness of the matter for judicial 
action).70   
Clearly, we have not seen the last of manifest disregard, which the 
Second Circuit believes lingers as “judicial gloss” on the FAA’s stipulated 
vacatur grounds.71 This is because the Supreme Court failed in Hall Street 
to clearly delineate what role, if any, “manifest disregard of the law” 
continues to play under the specific terms of the FAA, most notably Section  
10(a)(4). The Court briefly noted that “some courts have thought… 
‘manifest disregard’ may have been shorthand for Section 10(a)(3) or 
Section 10(a)(4)”72—but stopped short of providing guidance on the 
appropriateness of such thinking or how either section might underpin 
judicial scrutiny of the legal basis of an award. Some courts interpreted Hall 
Street as eliminating the principle in cases under the FAA73 while the 
Second Circuit and others have continued to apply the principle with or 
without reference to Hall Street.74 Now, Stolt-Nielsen suggests, “manifest 
                                                 
70 See id. at 1777 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
71 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.   
72 Hall Street Assoc., 552 U.S. at 585 (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade 
Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003)).  
73 See, e.g., Ramos-Santiago v. UPS, 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) (acknowledging 
in dicta that “manifest disregard of the law is not a valid ground for vacating or modifying 
an arbitral award in cases brought under the [FAA]”); Robert Lewis Rosen Assocs. v. 
Webb, 566 F.Supp.2d 228, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding manifest disregard doctrine  no 
longer good law and vacatur was limited to grounds stated in the FAA); Supreme Oil Co. v. 
Abondolo, 568 F.Supp.2d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding manifest disregard of law is 
not ground for vacatur under the FAA after Hall Street Associates).      
74 See, e.g.,  Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 607 F.3d 634, 641 n.5 
(9th Cir. 2010)  (arbitrators do not exceed their powers” when they merely misinterpret or 
incorrectly apply the governing law; the award must be “completely irrational” or show a 
“manifest disregard of the law”); UMass Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers’ Union, 527 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2008) (courts still retain “inherent 
powers outside” the FAA to vacate arbitral awards, including situations in which the 
arbitrator acts in disregard of law). In a number of recent cases courts have considered 
challenges based on manifest disregard without reference to Hall Street Associates, 552 
U.S. 576 (2008). See, e.g., Radetsky v. Ferris Baker Watts, Inc., No. 06-CV-1284 (Sept. 3, 
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disregard,” whatever it is, may still exist! The grey areas are particularly 
intriguing with respect to Section 10(a)(4), which supports judicial vacatur 
of an award “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.” Although Hall 
Street came down strongly against extra-statutory contractual bases for 
vacatur, might what the Second Circuit terms “judicial gloss” permit parties 
to give form and content to the boundaries of arbitrators’ authority and what 
constitutes “exceeding their powers” under Section 10(a)(4)? Might, for 
example, parties trigger judicial review of errors of law by describing a 
failure to faithfully observe and apply particular law as “in excess of the 
arbitrator’s powers”?75 While it is highly doubtful that the Stolt-Nielsen 
majority actively contemplated, or relishes, the prospect, there is no doubt 
that hopeful attorneys will seize on the wisp of a possibility of wedging a 
foot in the door of vacatur. Although, as in the past, very few awards will 
                                                                                                                            
2008) (considering challenges to arbitration awards on grounds of manifest disregard 
without reference to Hall Street); Grigsby & Assocs. v. M Secs. Inv., Inc., 2008 WL 
2959730, 2-4 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2008) (without discussing Hall Street Associates, 
confirming an arbitration award after concluding it did not manifestly disregard the law and 
was “not arbitrary and capricious”); Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 Fed.Appx. 186, 196-97 (D. 
Col. 2008) (without discussing Hall Street Associates, partially vacating an award on the 
basis of manifest disregard); Remote Solution Co. v. FGH Liquidating Corp., 568 
F.Supp.2d 534, 543-45 (D. Del. 2008) (without discussing Hall Street Associates, the court 
confirmed an award, finding no manifest disregard of law in award of attorney fees 
pursuant to a contractual provision).  
75 The Court in Hall Street Associates did not specifically address this possibility, which 
would by definition involve judicial activity under the existing terms of the FAA and not 
supplementary terms such as those the Court explicitly proscribed.  On the other hand, such 
an approach seems contrary to Hall Street Associates’ declaration of “a national policy 
[under the FAA] favoring . . . just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s 
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.” Hall Street Assocs., 552 U.S. at 577, 
588; see Thomas J. Stipanowich, Expanded Review of Awards: Hall Street and Cable 
Connection, in 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECTION OF PUBLIC UTILITY, 
COMMUNICATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION LAW (2010) (describing current possibilities for 
expanded judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards, and other alternatives).        
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actually be overturned on grounds of “manifest disregard,”76 the Court’s 
failure to effectively put the matter to bed will continue to reduce certainty 
and generate additional transaction costs respecting arbitration awards. 77   
   
IV. RENT-A-CENTER, WEST, INC. V. JACKSON: REPLACING THE 
GATEKEEPER   
 
 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson78 involves the critical nexus of 
three important bodies of doctrine in the law of arbitration. One involves the 
principle, first enunciated by the Court in 1967, that executory arbitration 
agreements are separable from the contracts of which they are a part for the 
purposes of enforcement—thereby permitting arbitrators to address 
defenses to the validity or enforceability of the larger contract.79 A second 
stream of caselaw surrounds the enforceability of contractual agreements to 
give arbitrators authority to address issues associated with the scope of 
arbitrable issues or the existence, validity or enforceability of the arbitration 
agreement itself.80 The third body of doctrine is the substantive state law of 
unconscionability, which has come into play in numerous federal and state 
court decisions as the primary judicially-declared limit on the enforceability 
                                                 
76 Lawrence R. Mills et al., Vacating Arbitration Awards, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 
2005, at 24, 25 fig.5 (summarizing data indicating only about four percent of motions to 
vacate based on “manifest disregard” result in vacatur). 
77 The majority also borrowed, for the first time in a commercial arbitration decision by the 
Court, and somewhat anachronistically, the maxim from the collective bargaining realm 
that "[i]t is only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the 
agreement and effectively 'dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice' that his decision 
may be unenforceable." Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 
(2010). This principle of labor arbitration must now be regarded as a part of the law 
surrounding FAA Section 10(a)(4). 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(4) (2009). 
78 Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
79 See infra text accompanying notes 82-99.   
80 See infra text accompanying notes 100-20. 
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of agreements to arbitrate, habitually in the realm of adhesion contracts.81 
The Court’s disposition of those elements in Rent-A-Center will 
undoubtedly have huge practical ramifications for those bound by 
arbitration agreements of all kinds.     
 
A.  Background of the Case: Three Bodies of Doctrine  
 
 1. Prima Paint and Separability 
 
 Section 2 of the FAA states that written contracts to arbitrate are: . . . valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable . . . except on ‘‘such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.’’82 This section expressly makes 
predispute arbitration agreements (like agreements to submit existing disputes) 
enforceable and puts arbitration contracts on equal footing with other types of 
contracts,83 but also makes clear that parties can raise standard contractual defenses 
to challenge the validity of an arbitration agreement.84 Consideration of such 
defenses is a “gateway” issue that courts are called upon to address, along with 
questions about the presence of appropriate written language of agreement and 
“scope issues” (that is, whether a controversy that falls within the scope of that 
                                                 
81 See infra text accompanying notes 121-61. 
82 The Section states in full: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, 
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.  
9 U.S.C. §2 (1947). 
83 See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 474 (1989).   
84 See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 US 681, 687 (1996).   
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agreement).85 The FAA implements this basic “substantive rule” of enforcement by 
permitting parties to apply to a federal court for a stay of the trial of arbitrable 
issues under Section 3 or a motion to compel arbitration under Section 4.  
  The precise boundaries of courts’ “gateway” role in considering 
contractual defenses to arbitration agreements, and the respective purviews 
of courts and arbitrators under the FAA, were at issue in Prima Paint Corp. 
v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.86 Prima Paint purchased Flood & 
Conklin’s (‘‘F&C’’) paint business and entered into a consulting agreement 
with the chairman of F&C. Soon Prima Paint stopped making payments 
under the agreements, charging that F&C had breached both agreements by 
fraudulently representing that it was solvent when it intended to file for 
bankruptcy. F&C served a notice of intent to arbitrate. Prima Paint 
subsequently filed a lawsuit in the federal court in New York seeking to 
rescind the consulting agreement as fraudulently induced. Prima Paint 
argued that since the arbitration agreement must rise or fall with the rest of 
the contract, its fraud defense must be addressed by a court of law.87 The 
Supreme Court, however, reached a contrary conclusion and upheld the 
dismissal of Prima Paint’s appeal from a grant of F&C’s motion to compel 
arbitration. The Court ruled that the broad terms of the parties’ agreement to 
arbitrate, the arbitrators and not a court of law should resolve the question 
of fraudulent inducement. The Court’s decision—founded on the principle 
that the arbitration clause should be considered separately from the 
underlying contract for the purpose of enforcement—has become one of the 
cornerstones of modern arbitration law. Although this approach could result 
                                                 
85 See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002); Prima Paint Corp. 
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-404, 414 (1967). 
86 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 403-404, 414. 
87 Id. at 398.  
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in the seeming paradox of arbitrators ruling that the contract that gave rise 
to their own jurisdiction was the fruit of fraud, and therefore invalid, the 
doctrine of separability (or severability) was—and continues to be—
justified on the ground that the vitality of arbitration clauses will be 
undermined by allowing parties to waylay the process through front-end 
challenges to the whole contract.88 Only where the challenge is aimed 
directly at the arbitration provision itself is there a place for judicial 
intervention at the “gateway”; otherwise, the issue of the contract’s validity 
is for the arbitrator in the first instance.  
 In addition to becoming part of arbitration doctrine under the FAA, this 
rationale has proven persuasive in the arena of international arbitration, where the 
principle of separability is broadly established.89 It is also widely embraced under 
the arbitration law of various U.S. states,90 and was expressly recognized in the 
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act.91   
                                                 
88 The Court found this conclusion “explicit” under § 4 of the FAA, under which federal 
courts are directed to compel arbitration upon proof that “the making of the agreement for 
arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration agreement] is not in issue”—a 
provision that reinforced the limited nature of front-end judicial “gatekeeping” and 
promoted the parties’ presumed desire for early resort to arbitration…   
[I]f the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause 
itself—an issue which goes to the ‘‘making’’ of the agreement to 
arbitrate—the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the 
statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider 
claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally. . . . We 
hold, therefore . . . that a federal court may consider only issues 
relating to the making and performance of the agreement to 
arbitrate.  In so concluding, we not only honor the plain meaning 
of the statute but also the unmistakably clear congressional 
purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties 
to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in 
the courts.  
Id. at 403-04. 
89 See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Model Law On 
International Commercial Arbitration, at 8, art. 16(1) (2008), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf.  
90 See, e.g., Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 644 So. 2d 1258 (Ala. 1994); U.S. Insulation, 
Inc. v. Hilro Constr. Co., 705 P.2d 490 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Erickson, Arbuthnot, 
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 The continuing vitality—and potential reach—of the separability principle 
under the FAA was made evident in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,92 a 
decision involving a broad-form arbitration provision in a standardized consumer -
lending contract. The case was brought as a putative class action in Florida state 
court against Buckeye, a check-cashing service; the plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant had charged usurious interest rates and that its standard deferred-
payment agreement violated various Florida lending and consumer-protection 
laws, rendering it criminal on its face. Buckeye filed a motion to compel 
arbitration under the broad arbitration provision in it contract. The trial court 
denied the motion, holding that a court rather than an arbitrator should resolve a 
claim that a contract is illegal and void ab initio. This decision was reversed by an 
appellate court but reinstated by the Florida Supreme Court, which concluded that 
“to enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful ‘‘‘could 
breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but also is criminal in 
nature. ...”93 The Court granted certiorari and, in a 7-1 decision (with one 
abstention), reversed the Florida Court. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia 
reasoned that the severability principle of Prima Paint was now applicable in state 
as well as federal court actions subject to the FAA under the Court’s holding in 
Southland Corp. v. Keating,94 which recognized FAA Section 2 as a source of 
federal substantive arbitration law which was ‘‘applicable in state and federal 
                                                                                                                            
McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 673 P.2d 251 (Cal. 1983); Hercules 
& Co. v. Shama Rest. Corp., 613 A.2d 916 (D.C. 1992); Brown v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 
921 P.2d 146 (Haw. 1996); Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 400 N.E.2d 858 (Mass. 
1980); Weinrott v. Carp, 298 N.E.2d 42 (N.Y. 1973); Weiss v. Voice/Fax Corp., 640 
N.E.2d 875 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Jackson Mills, Inc. v. BT Capital Corp., 440 S.E.2d 877 
(S.C. 1994); South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Great W. Coal, 437 S.E.2d 22 (S.C. 1993); 
Gerwell v. Moran, 10 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. App. 1999); Schneider, Inc. v. Research-Cottrell, 
Inc., 474 F. Supp 1179 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law); New Process Steel 
Corp. v. Titan Indus. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (applying Texas law); 
Pinkis v. Network Cinema Corp., 512 P.2d 751 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). 
91 See REVISED UNIF. ARB. ACT § 6(c) & cmt.4 U.L.A. 18 (amended 2000). 
92 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).  
93 Id. at 440. 
94 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
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courts.’’95 Because the challenge to the present agreement did not target the 
arbitration provisions, there was no room for judicial intervention at the “gateway” 
under the FAA, and the issues he challenged should therefore be initially 
considered by an arbitrator, not a court. It was irrelevant, concluded Scalia, that 
Florida public policy and contract law might refuse to sever or salvage “parts of a 
contract found illegal and void under Florida law;’’ in Southland, the Court ruled 
that state law “could [not] bar enforcement of Section 2, even in the context of 
state-law claims brought in state court.”96 Moreover, Prima Paint failed to 
distinguish between defenses making contracts voidable and those rendering 
contracts illegal or void—all defenses were for the arbitrator in the first instance 
unless directed specifically at the agreement to arbitrate.97   
 Although the separability doctrine has attained broad acceptance 
domestically and internationally in the arena of commercial contracts, Buckeye’s 
projection of the Prima Paint into the realm of non-negotiated mass consumer 
credit contracts and illegality on the face of an agreement raised concerns that the 
separability principle vouchsafed to arbitrators too much authority to police illegal 
behavior and provided companies with a mechanism for effectively avoiding the 
courthouse.98 While judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is theoretically 
available at the post-award stage, as a practical matter its potency is significantly 
diminished as a result of the timing and, even more, by the narrow bases for 
vacatur of award under the FAA.99      
    
  
                                                 
95 Id. at 12. 
96 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 445. 
97 Id. 
98 See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107 (2007) (advocating repeal of the separability 
doctrine).   
99 See Cross, supra note 6; 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
955-958 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 2009). 
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 2. Contractual Allocation of “Gateway” Decisions  
 
 Although the separability doctrine significantly diminished the 
“gateway” role of courts under the FAA, courts still serve as “gatekeepers” 
to make determinations relating to the arbitration agreement itself. The 
kinds of questions they may be called upon to address are (1) questions 
regarding the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement, as where a 
party claims to have been deceived as to the true nature or content of an 
arbitration agreement or raises other contractual defenses to its 
enforcement;100 and (2) questions about whether or not a particular dispute 
falls within the scope of an arbitration provision.101 As it happens, however, 
both categories of questions have themselves been deemed to be arbitrable 
in certain circumstances under U.S. and other law.102   
 In fact, agreements to delegate “gateway” functions to arbitrators are 
ubiquitous in business contracts. Concerns about delays and inefficiencies 
caused by front-end resort to court prompted drafters to give arbitrators 
authority to resolve not only disputes relating to the contract of which the 
arbitration provision is a part, but also (1) defenses aimed at the existence, 
validity or enforceability of the arbitration provision itself, or (2) issues 
respecting the scope of its application. Clauses addressing “Kompetenz-
Kompetenz” (the authority of arbitrators to address their own competence to 
hear certain controversies under an arbitration agreement) are a standard 
                                                 
100 See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (June 21, 2010); First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
101 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 872 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 1989); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985). 
102 See generally BORN, supra note 99, 851-1001 (discussing the doctrine of “competence-
competence” (“Kompetenz-Kompetenz”) under international law and the laws of the U.S. 
and other countries).    
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feature of international commercial arbitration rules.103 Virtually all of the 
leading procedures for commercial—that is, business-to-business—
arbitration in the United States include language that purports to give 
arbitrators plenary authority over all issues, including those surrounding the 
enforceability of the arbitration agreement and other arbitrability issues.104 
 Of course, “[t]here is . . . almost inescapable circularity” to 
provisions that grant arbitrators authority to address questions about the 
existence or validity of the very arbitration agreement from which they 
derive their power.105 As Gary Born explains, “[i]n these circumstances” 
any authority devolving upon an arbitration tribunal must spring from 
national or international law.106 Internationally, such authority may be 
found under the European Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law, and, 
impliedly, under the New York Convention.107 
 Although the FAA contains no express provisions addressing the 
possibility of allocating “gateway” functions to arbitrators, Supreme Court 
decisions have addressed the issue. One critical precedent is AT&T 
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America,108 a case 
involving a dispute over interpretation of the breadth of application of an 
                                                 
103 See id. at 869-870.   
104 For example, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Commercial Arbitration 
Rules state, “The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, 
including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration 
agreement.” AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, Commercial Arbitration Rules and 
Mediation Procedures, R-7(a) (June 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440. 
105 BORN, supra note 99, at 870.   
106 Id.   
107 Id.   
108 AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986).   
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arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement under the Taft-
Hartley Act,109 the Court explained:  
 
[W]hether a[n] … agreement creates a duty for the 
parties to arbitrate the particular grievance ... is 
undeniably an issue for judicial determination. … 
Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide 
otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to 
arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the 
arbitrator.110    
 
In First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan,111 a unanimous Court embraced this 
dictum from the labor arbitration arena as the foundation for a standard for 
judicial enforcement of agreements to submit what it characterized as 
“arbitrability” issues to arbitration under the FAA. Unlike AT&T 
Technologies, which involved who should decide a question of the breadth 
of a concededly valid agreement to arbitrate, First Options was concerned 
with who should decide whether the defendant investors had actually 
assented to an arbitration agreement with a stock trade-clearing firm. In 
order for the question to be directed to the arbitrator, reasoned Justice 
Breyer’s opinion, there would need to be a finding of the parties’ objective 
intent to arbitrate arbitrability.112 However, because an agreement of this 
                                                 
109 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (2006).   
110 AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649. The Court went on to conclude, however, that courts 
should construe arbitration agreements broadly, and “resolve doubts in favor of coverage.” 
Id. at 656 (citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 
(1960)). 
111 First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).    
112 Id. at 944-45. 
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kind would empower arbitrators to address issues that parties might 
reasonably expect a judge to decide,113 it was appropriate to require an 
enhanced burden of proof in the form of “clear and unmistakable” evidence 
that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.114   
 The Court proceeded to find no such evidence in the case before it. 
Had the decision been otherwise, however, the arbitrator’s decision would 
have been accorded significant deference. Justice Breyer made clear that 
once a judgment is made that parties have committed questions of 
arbitrability to the arbitrator: 
 
                                                 
113 “Giving the arbitrators that power... might too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a 
matter they reasonably would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide.” Id. at 
945.  Breyer continues: 
In this manner the law treats silence or ambiguity about the 
question ‘‘who (primarily) should decide arbitrability’’ differently 
from the way it treats silence or ambiguity about the question 
‘‘whether a particular merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it 
is within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement’’—for in 
respect to this latter question the law reverses the presumption...  
Id. at 944. 
With respect to the pro-arbitration presumption that applies to a court’s determination of 
whether a particular dispute is arbitrable, the Court cites Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (“‘[A]ny doubts concerning the scope 
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration’”) (quoting Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).  Breyer explains, 
The latter question arises when the parties have a contract that 
provides for arbitration of some issues. In such circumstances, the 
parties likely gave at least some thought to the scope of arbitration. 
And, given the law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration... 
one can understand why the law would insist upon clarity before 
concluding that the parties did not want to arbitrate a related 
matter. ... On the other hand, the former question—the ‘‘who 
(primarily) should decide arbitrability’’ question—is rather arcane. 
A party often might not focus upon that question or upon the 
significance of having arbitrators decide the scope of their own 
powers ...  
First Options, 514 U.S. at 945.  
114 First Options, 514 U.S. at 944 (quoting AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649). 
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[T]he court’s standard for reviewing the arbitrator’s 
decision about that matter should not differ from the 
standard courts apply when they review any other 
matter that the parties have agreed to arbitrate… [T]he 
court should give considerable leeway to the arbitrator, 
setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow 
circumstances.115 
 
First Options has been the subject of considerable commentary, much of it 
critical.116 Particular concerns have been raised about the Court’s use of the 
vague term “arbitrability” and its appropriation of dictum from labor 
precedents that involved questions of scope under concededly valid 
arbitration agreements in support of a decision involving the question of the 
very existence of a valid agreement.117 Some courts have continued to insist 
that challenges to existence, validity or enforceability must be reserved for 
judicial determination,118 since, as explained by the Third Circuit, “a 
contract cannot give an arbitral body any power, much less the power to 
determine its own jurisdiction [,i]f the parties never entered into it.”119 But a 
growing number of courts applied the dictum of First Options to enforce 
“clear and unmistakable” provisions empowering arbitrators to address 
questions of the existence, validity or enforceability of arbitration 
                                                 
115 Id. at 943 (citing AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649; Warrior, 363 U.S. at 583, n. 7).   
116 See, e.g., Steven H. Reisberg, The Rules Governing who Decides Jurisdictional Issues: 
First Options v. Kaplan Revisited, 20 AM. REV. OF INT’L ARB. 159 (2009); Cross, supra 
note 6, at 24-35. See generally BORN, supra note 99, at 914 n.327 (citing numerous 
articles).    
117 See e.g., Reisberg, supra, note 116, at 159-60; Cross, supra note 6, at 27-30.   
118 See, e.g., China Minmetals Materials Import & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 
274, 287 (3d Cir. 2003); Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 591 (7th 
Cir. 2001).     
119 China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 288.   
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agreements, not just issues of scope.120 However desirable this outcome in 
the broad run of commercial contracts, it raises significant potential 
concerns on the part of advocates for consumers and employees who find 
themselves subject to boilerplate arbitration provisions prepared by a 
company lawyer. It requires little imagination to appreciate that an 
agreement consigning virtually all legal and factual issues to arbitrators, 
including challenges aimed at the very source of their authority, is a 
singularly effective way of making arbitration a procedural black box, 
hermetically sealed from court intrusion.    
 
 3. Unconscionability 
  
 Unconscionability is the key doctrine used by courts in addressing 
perceived due process concerns growing out of arbitration agreements in 
contracts of “adhesion.”121 The doctrine evolved as a means of permitting 
courts to police contracts for “gross inequality of bargaining power, 
together with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party.”122 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., Terminix Int’l Co., LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1331-2 
(11th Cir. 2005); Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co. Ltd., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 
2005); and other cases cited at 581 F.3d at 917.  See generally Cross, supra note 6, at 34 
n.129 (citing authority), 61-67 (discussing cases).  
121 See generally, Bruhl, supra note 2 (describing Court-directed expansion of FAA); 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of 
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO. ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 757 (2004).   
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981) states: 
d. Weakness in the bargaining process. A bargain is not 
unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in 
bargaining position, nor even because the inequality results in an 
allocation of risks to the weaker party. But gross inequality of 
bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to 
the stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction 
involved elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that 
the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or 
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Proving unconscionability normally requires a showing of circumstances 
indicating an “adhesive” bargain (so-called “procedural unconscionability”) 
as well as unfair contract terms (“substantive unconscionability”).123 As 
formulated in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, unconscionability affords courts 
considerable discretion in tailoring appropriate remedies—from invalidating 
a contract to narrow blue-penciling.124   
 Until fairly recently, judicial decisions grounded on 
unconscionability doctrine were few and far between.125 With the expanded 
use of binding arbitration provisions in consumer and employment 
contracts, however, unconscionability doctrine came into vogue as a means 
of curtailing perceived abuses of corporate power aimed at denying 
                                                                                                                            
did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms. 
Factors which may contribute to a finding of unconscionability in 
the bargaining process include the following: belief by the stronger 
party that there is no reasonable probability that the weaker party 
will fully perform the contract; knowledge of the stronger party 
that the weaker party will be unable to receive substantial benefits 
from the contract; knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker 
party is unable reasonably to protect his interests by reason of 
physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to 
understand the language of the agreement, or similar factors. 
123 See generally Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 
1965); 8 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 18:9 
(4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 2010). 
124 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (“If a contract or term 
thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or 
may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable 
result”); U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2003) (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may 
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to 
avoid any unconscionable result”). 
125 See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: 
Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 610 (2009); Bruhl, 
supra note 2, at 1439-1442. 
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fundamentally fair procedures to other parties in contracts of adhesion.126 
Unconscionability has been a relatively successful mode127 of judicially 
challenging the enforceability of arbitration agreements containing 
unilateral arbitration clauses,128 limitations of remedies,129 class action 
waivers,130 confidential arbitration requirements,131 and fee-splitting and 
                                                 
126 Stempel, supra note 121, at 803-807; Bruhl, supra note 2, at 1440 fig.1. Cross, supra 
note 6, at 10 n.28 (Challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements based on 
unconscionability defences tend to represent sixteen to eighteen percent of all arbitration 
cases).    
127 It has been estimated that around forty percent of unconscionability defenses to 
arbitration agreements have meet with success in recent years. Cross, supra note 6, at 11 
n.20.    
128 See, e.g., Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
unconscionable, for lack of mutuality, clause requiring employee to arbitrate claims but 
allowing employer to bring judicial action); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., 
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689-94 (Cal. 2000) (finding arbitration clause unconscionable where it 
required employees but not employer to arbitrate claims and limited employees’ potential 
damages but not employer’s); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 
372-73 (N.C. 2008) (holding arbitration clause unconscionable because lender had 
managed to avoid ever arbitrating a claim against a borrower, while clause required 
borrowers to arbitrate claims against lender). 
129 See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming, without giving 
reasons, lower court’s holding that limitation of remedies was unconscionable); Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding unconscionable 
“asymmetry is compounded by the fact that the agreement limits the relief available to 
employees”).  
130 See, e.g., Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(holding class waiver unconscionable because it would “result in oppression and unfair 
surprise to the disadvantaged party”); Ting, 319 F.3d at 1150 (holding class waiver 
unconscionable because one-sided); Hall v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 592, 
603-04 (D.N.J. 2009) (finding arbitration provisions unconscionable because likely 
amounts of individual recovery were small and company was effectively immunized “from 
claims that would be suitable for class action resolution”); Tillman v. Comm’l Credit 
Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 373 (N.C. 2008) (holding that class waiver, together with 
other provisions in arbitration agreement, rendered agreement unconscionable; the class 
waiver “contribute[d] to the financial inaccessibility of the arbitral forum” and 
“contribute[d] to the one-sidedness of the clause because the right to join claims and pursue 
class actions would benefit only borrowers”); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 
1004 (Wash. 2007) (recognizing that majority of jurisdictions uphold class action waivers 
but citing cases from fifteen jurisdictions holding that class action waivers in arbitration 
agreements were substantively unconscionable); Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Oregon, 
Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 951 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (holding class waiver unconscionable because 
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“loser pays” schemes.132 While some courts have employed 
unconscionability to strike down entire arbitration agreements, others have 
taken a “surgical” approach, excising or reforming problematic provisions 
and sustaining the arbitration agreement.133 Predictably, the courts of some 
states, such as California, have been considerably more energetic in 
developing unconscionability doctrine than others.134  
                                                                                                                            
it was “unilateral in effect and . . . gives defendant a virtual license to commit, with 
impunity, millions of dollars’ worth of small-scale fraud”). 
131 See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151-52 (finding provision requiring that 
arbitration remain confidential unconscionable because it prevents “accumulat[ion] of a 
body of knowledge on a particular company” that could mitigate repeat player effect).  Cf. 
Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1180-83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
secrecy clause violates public policy, which “may be distinguished from a finding of 
unconscionability,” but hinges on similar concerns about repeat player effect and loss of 
information to the public). 
132 See, e.g., Ting, 319 F.3d at 1151 (holding requirement that customers split arbitration 
fees with corporation unconscionable because “some complainants would . . . face 
prohibitive arbitration costs, effectively deterring them from vindicating their statutory 
rights”); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 371-72 (N.C. 2008) 
(holding arbitration clause requiring loser to pay costs unconscionable where plaintiffs 
“live paycheck to paycheck” and “simply do not have the resources to risk facing these 
kinds of fees”); Vasquez-Lopez, 152 P.3d at 951-52 (holding cost-sharing  provision 
unconscionable because it makes cost of bringing an action prohibitive). 
133 Compare Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 695-99 (Cal. 
2000) (declining to sever unconscionable clauses from arbitration agreement because 
unconscionability “permeated”), Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1293 (9th 
Cir. 2006)  (striking down entire arbitration agreement because it had “multiple defects 
[that] indicate a systematic effort to impose arbitration . . . as an inferior forum”), and 
Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 373-74 (declining to sever unconscionable provisions because “this 
particular arbitration clause . . . does not allow for meaningful redress of grievances”) with 
Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 63 (1st Cir. 2007)  (severing 
unconscionable clause and upholding rest of arbitration agreement because both parties 
wanted this remedy) and Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 
unconscionable provisions of arbitration agreement invalid but an unconscionable aspect 
“revived”).   
134 California courts have employed unconscionability to deny enforcement to arbitration 
agreements on numerous occasions. In the seminal decision of Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669, the 
California Supreme Court used unconscionability doctrine as the basis for considering what 
procedural protections would be essential requisites for the arbitration of statutory 
discrimination claims under an employment agreement. Such elements included an 
independent and impartial arbitrator, an opportunity for the employee to have adequate 
discovery, limits on the cost of arbitration, remedies akin to those available in court, a 
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 Significantly, before this year the U.S. Supreme Court has never 
applied, or specifically addressed in a holding, the doctrine of 
unconscionability or similar policy grounds in the arbitration context. Aside 
from general hortatory dicta, it has avoided pronouncements singling out 
arbitration provisions in “adhesion” contracts for special treatment.   
 The Court has stated repeatedly that “courts should remain attuned 
to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the 
sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 
‘for the revocation of any contract,’’135 and has enumerated 
unconscionability as among the “generally applicable contract defenses” 
that may invalidate an arbitration agreement.136 On the other hand, the 
Court has never actually affirmed the denial or limited enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement on such grounds. Regardless of the transactional 
setting, the votes of a majority of justices have regularly been mustered in 
support of the presumption that binding arbitration is an effective surrogate 
for public judicial resolution of statute-based claims as well as actions at 
common law in the absence of clear and specific evidence to the contrary.137 
                                                                                                                            
written decision allowing limited judicial review, and procedural ‘‘bilaterality.’’ Because 
not all of these requirements were met, the court struck down the entire agreement as 
unconscionable.   
135 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985); 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 
U.S. 614).   
136 See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (Arbitration 
agreements “may be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, 
duress or unconscionability.”); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 
U.S. 528, 555-56 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]n arbitration clause may be invalid 
without violating the FAA if . . . the provision is unconscionable”). 
137 In Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, the Court upheld a motion to compel arbitration of an 
employee’s Age Discrimination of Employment Claims. It reasoned that there was no 
proof that arbitration would be any less suitable than litigation in furthering the social 
policies underlying the ADEA. Among other things, the Court “decline[d] to indulge the 
presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or 
unwilling to retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators.’’ Id. at 30 (quoting 
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In the same vein, Court majorities have repeatedly postponed a ruling on a 
contested issue where the matter might be deferred to initial consideration 
by the arbitrator(s).138 In such cases the practical result is to put off judicial 
                                                                                                                            
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 634). There was, continued the Court, no indication that limitations 
on discovery would present a problem in the present context any more than in other statute-
based actions the Court had found to be arbitrable, such as RICO and antitrust claims. 
Moreover, ‘‘even if the arbitration could not go forward as a class action or class relief 
could not be granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the [ADEA] provides for the possibility 
of bringing a collective action does not mean that individual attempts at conciliation were 
intended to be barred... [and] it should be remembered that arbitration agreements will not 
preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief.” Id. at 32 
(citing Nicholson v. CPC Int’l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 241 (3rd Cir. 1989) (Becker, J., 
dissenting). 
Finally, the Court observed that unequal bargaining power between employers and 
employees was in itself “not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are 
never enforceable in the employment context.” The Court concluded: 
Courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the 
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or 
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds ‘for 
the revocation of any contract.’’ Id. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 
U.S. at 627). There is no indication in this case, however, that 
Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or defrauded 
into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his registration 
application. As with the claimed procedural inadequacies discussed 
above, this claim of unequal bargaining power is best left for 
resolution in specific cases.   
Id. 
See also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (mere supposition 
about overly burdensome arbitration costs is not sufficient reason to invalidate an 
arbitration agreement).   
138 Consider PacifiCare Health Sys, Inc. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531 (2003), involving an 
action by physicians against managed-health-care organizations (HMOs), on the basis, 
inter alia, of alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO). The defendant HMOs’ motion to compel arbitration of the RICO claims was 
denied by the district court on the ground that the arbitration clauses in the parties' 
agreements prohibited awards of “punitive damages,” thereby denying the arbitrator 
authority to provide meaningful relief in the form of treble damages under RICO and 
rendering the arbitration agreement unenforceable as to those claims. The Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed on the basis that it was unclear whether the 
arbitration provisions actually prevented arbitrators from awarding treble damages under 
RICO, since statutory treble damages provisions may play different roles and, in particular, 
RICO's treble-damages provision is remedial in nature. It was therefore not clear whether 
the parties intended the term “punitive” to encompass claims for treble damages under 
RICO. Because the Court did not know how the arbitrator would construe the limit on 
punitive damages, it would be premature for the Court to address them, and the proper 
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consideration until after arbitration hearings, at which time the relevant 
issues will be addressed within the relatively narrow confines of the 
statutory grounds for vacatur of award.139 These and other realities raise 
legitimate concerns about the Court’s willingness to embrace 
unconscionability doctrine to any meaningful degree.140  
 Even while unconscionability doctrine has come to play the primary 
role in policing arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion under the 
FAA, given the preemptive effect of that statute on attempts to regulate 
arbitration through state legislation, there has lingered the possibility that a 
Court majority might be mustered in favor of using preemption to 
dramatically narrow the role of unconscionability. A critical note of 
warning may be found in dicta in Perry v. Thomas,141 a decision in which 
                                                                                                                            
course was to compel arbitration and leave the matter initially to the arbitrator. Cf. 
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638 (“Having permitted the arbitration [of antitrust claims] to go 
forward, the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award-
enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust 
laws has been addressed”). 
139 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (2009), which states:  
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the 
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating 
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration--  
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means;  
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, or either of them;  
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing 
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of 
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced; or  
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the 
subject matter submitted was not made.  
See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (holding that FAA § 10 
provides the exclusive grounds for vacatur). 
140 See infra text accompanying notes 198-201.   
141 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987). 
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the Court held that an arbitration agreement in an employment contract was 
enforceable under the FAA. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, 
found that the federal substantive law of arbitrability preempted a section of 
the California Labor Code providing that wage collection actions “may be 
maintained ‘without regard to the existence of any private agreement to 
arbitrate.’”142 Although the Court declined to address the employee’s claim 
that the arbitration agreement was “an unconscionable, unenforceable 
contract of adhesion,” a matter not considered below, it took pains to 
address the “choice-of-law issue that arises when . . . [such] arguments are 
asserted.”143 In such cases, explained the Court, FAA Section 2 offers a 
“touchstone for choosing between state law principles and the principles of 
federal common law envisioned by the [FAA].”144          
[Section 2 directs that a]n agreement to arbitrate is 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, as a matter of 
federal law, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract. Thus, a 
state law principle that takes its meaning precisely from 
the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not 
comport with this requirement of § 2. A court may not, 
then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an 
arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a 
manner different from that in which it otherwise 
construes nonarbitration agreements under state law. 
Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an 
                                                 
142 CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1971).  
143 Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9. 
144 Id. 
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agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state law 
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for 
this would enable the court to effect what we hold today 
the state legislature cannot.145 
Although this language has not since been brought forth by the Court to 
quash federal or state court decisions relying on state unconscionability 
doctrine to strike down or reform arbitration agreements, it is clearly aimed 
at judicial decisions that regulate arbitration agreements qua arbitration 
agreements—that is, that focus on elements of arbitration agreements that 
are not present in contract provisions generally. Although it is possible to 
imagine a scenario in which an arbitration provision is struck down on 
unconscionability grounds applicable to contracts generally (as where, to 
use an extreme example, a party is physically forced to assent to an 
arbitration agreement), nearly all unconscionability defenses implicate 
concerns about specific substantive terms of the arbitration agreement: 
arbitrator selection, discovery and other administrative procedures, situs of 
hearings, costs and fees, remedies, and the like.146 These are all, or mostly, 
aspects of arbitration that bear no relationship to contracts generally.147 Put 
another way, it is highly unlikely that unconscionability doctrine would be 
employed by a federal or state court in any way other than to regulate 
arbitration as arbitration.            
                                                 
145 Id. (citations omitted, emphasis supplied). 
146 See supra text accompanying notes 128-132.   
147 There may, of course, be certain kinds of substantive elements that appear in an 
arbitration agreement that would be unconscionable whether or not an arbitration 
agreement is present. One possible example would be a purported waiver of punitive 
damages in an employment or consumer contract.  See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive 
Damages and the Consumerization of American Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
ARBITRATOR AS JUDGE… AND JUDGE OF JURISDICTION SYMPOSIUM 
   
166 
 Binding arbitration agreements in standardized contracts are seldom 
the subject of negotiation or of knowledgeable assent148 (indeed, it is 
probably fair to assume that the great majority of lawyers still lack all but 
the barest understanding of arbitration law and practice),149 and arbitration 
agreements can and do fall short of the reasonable expectations of 
employees and consumers in a variety of different ways.150 In the 1990s, a 
series of initiatives by public and private entities sought to address the most 
common concerns and develop minimum standards of due process for 
consumer and employment arbitration,151 but private “community” 
regulation, or self-regulation, is not alone sufficient to address the 
problem.152 Not so long ago, alleged material conflicts of interest in a major 
                                                 
148 See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and 
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 108 
(1997) (“[I]f all the firms in the market impose the same terms, shopping is impossible. ... 
Because form terms are often peripheral to the core of the transaction, the cost of fully 
understanding most form terms reasonably appears, at the time of contracting, to outweigh 
the benefit. Meaningful understanding of a form term should be recognized as including the 
ability to make an informed judgment about its value. With an arbitration clause, this 
would include some awareness not only of the procedural distinctions between arbitration 
and litigation, but also of any systemic disparity in outcomes generated by the two 
procedures. . . . In sum, individual contract adherents are in no position to alter the menu of 
form contract terms presented by the market”). 
149 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. Rev. 
831, 834 (2001). 
150 See id. at 836-37, 888; Schwartz, supra note 148, at 40-53. 
151 See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, 
EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOLS (1995), available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28535; NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., 
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOLS (1997), available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019; COMM’N ON HEALTH CARE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 
HEALTHCARE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOLS (1998), available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28633; THE DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF 




152 See Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 369, 371-72, 417-27 (2004). 
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provider of consumer credit arbitration services caused a state attorney 
general to take decisive action.153   
 The Supreme Court’s own decision in Shearson/American Express, 
Inc. v. McMahon154 enforcing arbitration of investor claims under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act was underpinned by the expectation 
that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would employ 
“expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures 
employed by [securities self-regulatory organizations] … [and to] “oversee 
and regulate the rules.”155 The SEC, with the assistance of its advisory 
body, the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA), has 
actively supervised ongoing debate and discussion among investor 
advocates, the Financial Industry Regulatory Association (FINRA), and 
other industry representatives, encouraging the continuing evolution of 
procedures that address public as well as private concerns.156 Importantly, 
                                                 
153 The Minnesota Attorney General accused the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), a 
Minnesota-based organization that specializes in and focuses on consumer debt actions, of 
violating state consumer fraud, deceptive trade practices, and false advertising laws by 
hiding financial connections to collection agencies and credit card companies. NAF had 
handled more than 214,000 collection claims in 2006, 60 percent of which were filed by 
law firms with ties to the collection industry. The NAF denied the allegations. In the 
summer of 2009 NAF ceased its consumer arbitration program as part of a settlement. 
Under the settlement, the NAF could continue to arbitrate certain types of claims 
performed under supervision of government entities or non-government organizations (e.g., 
Internet domain name, cargo, personal injury protection suits, etc.). Firm Agrees to End 
Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, at B8. In August 2009, Bank of 
America Corporation said that it would stop requiring that disputes with its credit card 
holders and banking and lending customers be settled by binding arbitration. Joshua Freed, 




154 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).   
155 Id. at 233.   
156 See Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitrators Do Not Grow on Trees, 14 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 49, 54-58 (2008); Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to 
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the ongoing oversight and dialogue has proven critical in the development 
of a host of pro-consumer modifications in securities arbitration 
procedures.157 McMahon reflects the Court’s acknowledgment of the need 
for outside regulation of consumer arbitration, but the model remains one-
of-a-kind; the Court has not sought to extend it to other arenas of consumer 
or employment arbitration.     
 In the broader realm of consumer and employment arbitration, 
especially given the extensive preemption of state legislative regulation by 
the FAA, effective judicial oversight is necessary to address various forms 
of overreaching. Fraud,158 the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,159 
and the doctrine of reasonable expectations160 have all been employed by 
state and federal courts in invalidating or reforming arbitration agreements. 
                                                                                                                            
Securities ADR, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 413, 420-24 (2006); Stipanowich, supra 
note 149, at 900-01. 
157 LINDA D. FIENBERG & KENNETH  L. ANDRICHIK, NASD DISPUTE RESOLUTION, THE 
ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT—A REPORT CARD (2007) available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/p036466
.pdf  (reporting developments regarding forum independence, financing and administration; 
disclosures to investors; arbitrator selection, quality and training; discovery; mediation; 
simplified and standard case rules; punitive damages; and other matters).   
158 See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997). 
159 See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
160 See, e.g., Engalla, 938 P.2d at 922 (holding that medical group may not compel 
arbitration where it administers own arbitration program, fraudulently misrepresents speed 
of arbitrator selection process, and forces delays); Broemmer v. Abortion Serv. of Phoenix, 
840 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Ariz. 1992) (refusing to enforce agreement in "adhesion contract" 
where drafter inserted potentially self-serving term requiring sole arbitrator of medical 
malpractice claims to be licensed medical doctor); Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of 
Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer 
Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267 (1995) (discussing procedural limitations 
of arbitration in treating consumer disputes with banks and lenders); Jean R. Sternlight, 
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding 
Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process 
Concerns , 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing due process concerns with arbitration 
under employment and consumer contracts).  
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Unconscionability, however, remains the most versatile tool available to 
courts.161    
   
B. History of the Case  
 
 In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, the Court confronted the 
question whether courts retain any authority to address a defense of 
unconscionability aimed at the arbitration provision in an employment 
contract when the agreement itself purports to assign sole responsibility for 
such decisions to the arbitrator. As is often the case, the majority opinion 
contained a surprise: while the First Options line of cases on delegation of 
gatekeeping functions was clearly in play, the majority also found a novel 
way to draw in the Prima Paint separability doctrine.    
 Jackson sued his former employer, Rent-A-Center (RAC), for race 
discrimination and retaliation; he alleged that he had been repeatedly passed 
over for promotions due to his race, and was terminated in retaliation for 
complaining. At the time of his employment as an account manager, 
Jackson and RAC executed a free-standing, four-page Mutual Agreement to 
Arbitrate that provided for “arbitration of all claims or controversies . . . 
past, present, or future.”162 It also stated:  
 
The Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court 
or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any 
dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, 
                                                 
161 See generally, Bruhl, supra note 2 (As the Supreme Court has shut off most other means 
of resisting arbitration, state unconscionability doctrine has become an attractive and 
successful tool for striking down arbitration agreements).   
162 Jackson v. Rent-A-Ctr., No. 03:07-CV-0050-LRH(RAM), 2007 WL 7030394, at *1 (D. 
Nev. June 7, 2007). 
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enforceability or formation of this Agreement 
including, but not limited to any claim that all or any 
part of this Agreement is void or voidable.163  
 
When RAC sought to compel arbitration pursuant to the clause, Jackson 
argued that the arbitration agreement was itself unenforceable on grounds of 
unconscionability, and should be struck down by the court. The district 
court, however, granted the employer's motion to compel arbitration. Citing 
the First Options line of cases, the court concluded that the agreement to 
arbitrate “clearly and unmistakably” gave the arbitrator exclusive authority 
to decide whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable.164 
Surprisingly, the district court also made reference to the separability 
doctrine, citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna165 for the 
proposition that “where the contract agreeing to arbitrate is challenged as a 
whole, it is for the arbitrator to decide the validity of the agreement.”166 
This is, strictly speaking, a misquotation of Buckeye and misapplication (or 
at least a novel extension) of the separability principle, which calls upon 
courts to permit arbitrators empowered by broad-form arbitration clauses to 
address defenses to the contract of which the arbitration provision is a part 
(as opposed to defenses to the arbitration provision itself).167 The arguable 
                                                 
163 Id. Extensive, free-standing arbitration agreements appear to be increasingly common in 
the employment sphere. To the extent that this approach draws the attention of employees 
to the arbitration agreement and the procedural implications of the process, it is a positive 
development. Of course, most employees need advice from legal counsel to fully 
understand the process. (The author is sometimes asked to review and comment on 
employment arbitration agreements.) There is, moreover, the problem of freedom of 
choice—which may be more ephemeral than real.      
164 Id. at *2 (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (2002)). 
165 Id. (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444-45 (2006)). 
166 Id.  
167 See supra text accompanying notes 86-99.   
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conceptual analogy is as follows: in the instant contract the provision 
granting the arbitrator exclusive authority respecting disputes about the 
“interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of [the arbitration 
agreement]” bears the same relationship to the arbitration agreement as a 
whole that the typical predispute (executory) arbitration agreement bears to 
a contract of which it is a part. This rough analogy was not lost on the 
Supreme Court majority, which would embrace the same logic;168 the 
dissent would reject the analogy.169     
 The district court supported its decision with the conclusion that, 
even if the court were to have examined Jackson’s assertion of 
unconscionability on the merits, the argument would probably fail for lack 
of evidence under applicable state law. Like many states, Nevada requires 
an agreement to be “both procedurally and substantively unconscionable”—
that is, combining (1) circumstances where a “party lacks a meaningful 
opportunity to agree to the terms because of unequal bargaining power or 
because the effect of the agreement is not readily understandable” with (2) 
“terms which are unfairly one-sided.”170 Jackson’s assertion that the 
plaintiff might “have to unfairly pay burdensome arbitration costs” was, the 
court concluded, a mere supposition that would not be substantively 
unconscionable and would be insufficient to invalidate an agreement.171    
                                                 
168 See infra text accompanying notes 187-192. 
169 See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc v. Jackson 130 S. Ct. 2771, 2781-88 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
170 Jackson v. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., No. 03:07-CV-0050-LRH(RAM), 2007 WL 7030394, 
at *2 (D. Nev. June 7, 2007) (quoting D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 120 Nev. 549, 553-54 
(Nev. 2004)).   
171 Id. at *3 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000)).  The court 
believed this conclusion was reinforced by the fact that the arbitration agreement 
“expressly contained a clause allowing the apportionment of costs to be altered in the event 
the law require[d] a different allocation of costs to make the [a]greement enforceable.” Id. 
The district court did not address two other arguments made by Jackson regarding 
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In a 2-1 decision, a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed,172 holding 
the FAA requires that, where a party explicitly challenges an arbitration 
clause on the basis of unconscionability, a court and not an arbitrator must 
first address the question. This is true, said the appellate court, even where 
the agreement's express terms delegate that determination to the 
arbitrator(s). Although the separability principle of Prima Paint and 
Buckeye gives arbitrators the authority to address challenges to the validity 
of the parties’ contract as a whole, the court explained, "when a party 
specifically challenges the validity of arbitration provision within a larger 
contract, apart from the validity of the contract as a whole, a court decides 
the threshold question of the enforceability of the arbitration provisions."173 
Before compelling arbitration under FAA Section 4, a court must be 
“satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to 
comply therewith is not in issue.”174 With respect to provisions that purport 
to give arbitrators the authority to decide arbitrability questions, First 
Options requires “clear and unmistakable evidence” of agreement.175   
Which brings us to the nub of the appellate majority’s decision—the 
nature of the evidence to be considered by a court in determining that an 
agreement to arbitrate arbitrability is “clear and unmistakable.” It may be 
necessary, the majority reasoned, for a court to look beyond seemingly clear 
                                                                                                                            
substantive unconscionability—namely, that (1) the provisions of the agreement required 
arbitration of claims the employee was likely to bring, but not the claims that the employer 
was likely to bring and (2) limitations on discovery in the arbitration agreement were one-
sided and unfair.  See infra text accompanying note 182.   
172 Jackson v. Rent-A-Ctr. W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2008). 
173 Id. at 915. 
174 Id. at 916 (quoting Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 4 (2000)).   
175 Jackson, 581 F.3d at 915 (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 
938, 944 (1995)).  
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and unambiguous language of agreement to ascertain whether a party’s 
assent was meaningful.  In the instant case,  
 
Jackson [the employee] does not dispute that the 
language of the Agreement clearly assigns the 
arbitrability determination to the arbitrator. What he 
does dispute, however, is that he meaningfully agreed 
to the terms of the Agreement to Arbitrate, which he 
contends is procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable. Jackson argues that, in light of the 
parties’ unequal bargaining power, the fact that the 
Agreement was presented as a non-negotiable condition 
of his employment, and the absence of any meaningful 
opportunity to modify the terms of the Agreement, he 
did not meaningfully assent to the Agreement.176      
 
First Options and other Supreme Court precedents require arbitration 
contracts to be enforced in accordance with “ordinary state-law principles 
that govern the enforcement of contracts,”177 and the FAA was designed, 
among other things, to put arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as 
other contracts.”178 It would be inconsistent with these tenets to say “that 
where arbitration provisions—unlike other contractual provisions—are 
concerned, clear contractual language is enforceable per se.”179 Therefore, 
“where a party specifically challenges arbitration provisions as 
                                                 
176 Jackson, 581 F.3d at 917 (emphasis added).   
177 Id. (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 944).   
178 Jackson, 581 F.3d at 917, (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 
(1974)) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-68, at 1-2 (1924)).   
179 Jackson, 581 F.3d at 917 (emphasis added). 
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unconscionable and hence invalid,” a court should have the ability to look 
behind the language.180 The appellate panel proceeded to uphold the district 
court’s determination that the cost provision in the instant arbitration 
agreement was not unconscionable, since Jackson presented no evidence 
indicating that the costs of arbitration would actually be prohibitive.181 
However, it directed further hearings on two other issues of substantive 
unconscionability raised by Jackson—specifically, that the arbitration 
agreement’s coverage and discovery terms “were one-sided and unfairly 
favored the [e]mployer.”182 
In dissent, Circuit Judge Hall emphasized that as arbitration 
agreements go, Jackson’s was relatively favorable and lacked key elements 
of adhesion.183 Jackson’s allegations that the agreement was a non-
negotiable condition of employment appeared to be contradicted by the 
agreement itself, and his substantive complaints about the agreement were 
“thinner than most.”184 Such “bare allegations,” he argued, should not give 
cause for a judicial mini-trial on unconscionability, especially since the 
contract “clearly and unmistakably” assigns such issues to the arbitrator. 
                                                 
180 Id. at 918-919. The court distinguished a number of decisions which enforced provisions 
for the arbitration of arbitrability in the context of “agreements between sophisticated 
commercial entities.” Id. It cited with approval Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7 
(1st Cir. 2009), a case involving an action by a class of franchisees against a corporation 
for fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract and violations of various labor laws. In that 
case the First Circuit ruled that a party challenging a provision empowering arbitrators to 
rule on arbitrability issues “is entitled to have a court determine whether ‘the arbitration 
remedy is illusory.’” Id. at 13. The concern, the court explained, was not with 
unconscionability—essentially a fairness issue—but more narrowly with whether the 
arbitration regime here is structured so as to prevent a litigant from having access to the 
arbitrator to resolve claims, including unconscionability defenses. Id.     
181 Jackson, 581 F.3d at 919. 
182 Id. at 920.   
183 See id. (Hall, J., dissenting). 
184 See id. (Hall, J., dissenting) (citing Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1267 
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). 
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Hall concluded that the majority’s decision was an inappropriate expansion 
of First Options and other cited precedents, and, for circumstances where 
parties appear to have agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, proposed a more 
limited “gateway” role for district courts in policing unconscionability and 
related concerns,  
 
perhaps permitting courts to remain attuned to “well-
supported” claims of unconscionability or the potential 
that arbitration might be illusory, while still resolving 
“any doubts” as to what the parties agreed in favor of 
arbitration.185       
 
C. The Court’s Decision: Once More to the Fount of Federal 
Substantive Law 
  
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard arguments in the 
case; the result was, once again, a 5-4 decision reversing the judgment of 
the court of appeals.186 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia spurned the 
logic of the Ninth Circuit majority respecting the First Options line of cases 
and embraced the district court’s extension of Prima Paint separability 
principles. Tapping once again the increasingly deep well of substantive 
arbitration law under the FAA, Scalia’s opinion makes clear that where a 
contract “clearly and unmistakably” delegates gateway questions to 
                                                 
185 Jackson, 581 F.3d at 921-922 (citing Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 13 
(1st Cir. 2009)). Judge Hall pointed out that in the Awuah decision favorably cited by the 
majority, the First Circuit insisted that a litigant meet a “high burden” to show that 
arbitration was “truly illusory.” Id. at 921-922 (citing Awuah, 554 F.3d at 13).    
186 See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
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arbitrators, unconscionability challenges must be focused on the delegation 
provision alone. 
 Scalia begins by singling out for separate consideration two 
provisions in the parties’ lengthy agreement to arbitrate, both of which 
purport “to settle by arbitration a controversy” as described by FAA Section 
2: (1) the basic provision calling for arbitration of “‘past, present or future’ 
disputes arising out of [the employment contract]” and (2) the provision 
delegating “gateway” issues to the arbitrator (“[t]he Arbitrator … shall have 
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the … enforceability 
… of this Agreement.”)187 The controversy at issue is the alleged 
unconscionability of the agreement, and the provision Rent-A-Center seeks 
to enforce is the second, “delegation” provision. Such a provision is readily 
enforceable under the First Options line of cases.188 Furthermore, explains 
Scalia,  
 
[it] is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the 
party seeking arbitration asks the federal court to 
enforce, and the FAA operates on this additional 
arbitration agreement just as it does on any other. … 
[It] is valid under § 2 “save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
        
While the parties’ intent to arbitrate arbitrability issues must be established 
by “clear and unmistakable evidence,” this is an “‘interpretive rule’ based 
                                                 
187 Id. at 2777 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24 (1983)). 
188 See Rent-A-Ctr. W., 130 S. Ct. at 2777-79. 
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on an assumption about parties’ expectations.189 It does not, Scalia insists, 
embrace questions of validity (including alleged unconscionability), which 
are the province of FAA Section 2. Scalia and the Court majority thereby 
reject the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that unconscionability is inextricably 
intertwined with proof of intent under First Options and progeny.   
 Scalia instead employs the doctrine of severability (separability) to 
determine the allocation of functions between courts and arbitrators in the 
presence of a provision delegating “gateway” provisions to arbitrators. To 
paraphrase Scalia’s argument, a special provision empowering arbitrators to 
address issues relating to arbitrability, including the enforceability of the 
arbitration agreement, operates within an arbitration agreement in a manner 
directly analogous to the operation of a standard arbitration provision that 
provides for resolution of all disputes arising under or relating to the 
contract within which it is contained. Under Prima Paint and progeny, 
therefore, defenses to the whole agreement should normally be addressed by 
the arbitrators, but courts (under FAA Section 2 or the implementing 
sections FAA Section 3 or Section 4) should address defenses specifically 
aimed at the validity of the agreement to arbitrate (in this case, the 
delegation provision).190 Scalia insists that there is no reason why 
“delegation” clauses cannot be severed from the remainder of arbitration 
agreements in the same way that arbitration provisions are severed from the 
remainder of the contract within which they are contained—the rule should 
be the same under Section 2. Henceforth, the Court majority’s expansive 
                                                 
189 Id. at 2777 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)). 
190 Rent-A-Ctr W.., 130 S. Ct. at 2778. 
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application of the severability doctrine will be a “matter of substantive 
federal arbitration law” and not state law under the FAA.191   
 Unfortunately for him, Jackson’s unconscionability challenge was to 
the whole arbitration agreement, and not just the delegation provision. His 
assertions regarding substantive unconscionability were focused on the 
kinds of claims subject to the arbitration agreement, arbitration costs and 
discovery. None bore any relation to the agreement to let arbitrators 
determine arbitrability,192 and were therefore irrelevant to the enforceability 
of the delegation clause under Section 2.       
 Justice Stevens’ dissent on behalf of four members of the Court took 
strong issue with the majority’s “breezy assertion” that arbitration 
agreements could be treated analogously to other kinds of contracts in 
applying Prima Paint severability doctrine. The latter, Stevens explains, is 
“akin to a pleading standard” that parties must follow to trigger a court’s 
consideration of the validity of an arbitration clause. The court’s usual 
function as gatekeeper of arbitrability issues is taken over by arbitrators 
only when the arbitration agreement “clearly and unmistakably” evinces the 
parties’ mutual intent to re-allocate that function. To Stevens and the 
dissent, like the Ninth Circuit majority, a determination of the parties’ intent 
must take into account whether an agreement is unconscionable, since 
unconscionability implicates questions of meaningful choice and assent.193   
                                                 
191 Id. at 2783. 
192 Id. at 2780. 
193 Justice Stevens quotes the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §208, comment d 
(1979): 
Gross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms 
unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm 
indications that the transaction involved elements of deception or 
compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful 
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 To Stevens, the majority’s employment of severability doctrine 
within an agreement to arbitrate—described as “a new layer of 
severability—something akin to Russian nesting dolls”194 was wholly 
inconsistent with prior precedent, which categorically reserved general 
challenges to the making of an arbitration agreement to courts. It takes the 
always-controversial doctrine of Prima Paint too far. Severability as 
originally defined by that decision was justified on the basis that to permit a 
court to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the basis of defects in the 
“container” contract would defeat the “national policy favoring 
arbitration.”195 Severing the delegation clause, however, could not be said to 
achieve similar policy goals;196 since it would do no more than determine 
who addresses gateway issues.197        
 In Rent-A-Center, neither the majority nor the dissent offers pristine 
logic in favor of their respective positions. Scalia’s attempt—in a 
footnote—to summarily dispose of the Ninth Circuit’s and dissent’s 
argument that a determination of the parties’ “clear and unmistakable” 
intent to arbitrate arbitrability issues fails to explain why allegations of 
unconscionability may not be relevant to that determination. It is clear that 
concerns about judicial determinations of unconscionability are virtually 
always bound up in concerns about the practical realities of assent in mass 
contracting, and the relative lack of information and leverage possessed by 
                                                                                                                            
choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to 
asset to the unfair terms. 
In a footnote, Stevens acknowledged that some of employee Jackson’s arguments might be 
directed not to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement as a whole but rather to 
individual contract terms, and might be properly for the arbitrator.  Rent-A-Ctr., W., 130 S. 
Ct. at 2784 n.7.   
194 Rent-A-Ctr., W., 130 S. Ct. at 2786. 
195 Id. at 2787-88. 
196 Id. 
197 Id.   
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adhering parties. On the other hand, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the 
dissenting Justices squarely address the impact of a provision specifically 
delegating arbitrability to arbitrators, nor clearly explain why this should 
not call for a more nuanced judicial consideration of unconscionability-
based arguments.          
 
D. Implications of Rent-A-Center 
 
 Within the wide purview of the FAA, the practical significance of 
Rent-A-Center is great. The “projection” of clauses delegating to 
arbitrators’ authority to address the validity and enforceability of the 
arbitration agreement, rendered relatively ironclad by the Court majority’s 
aggressive interpretation of past precedents, into the realm of mass contracts 
is especially troubling. The Court has availed itself of the vastly malleable 
and expandable concept of federal arbitration law to dramatically limit 
lower courts’ use of their most effective tools for policing overreaching in 
arbitration agreements, notably unconscionability. The concept of 
“separability” and the related notion that arbitrators may be empowered to 
decide their own jurisdiction, and inconsistent with general concepts of 
contract interpretation, but nevertheless enjoy wide application in the world 
of commercial arbitration because they support the independence and 
autonomy of those systems from courts.198 Where the same concepts are 
employed beyond the commercial context, however, they arguably strike at 
the very heart of the FAA scheme itself. Testifying in favor of the FAA as a 
mechanism for overcoming historical judicial resistance to enforcing 
                                                 
198 See James M. Gaitis, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson and the Ongoing 
Assault on Party Autonomy, available at http://www.karlbayer.com/blog/?p=9732 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2010).  
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predispute arbitration agreements, Julius Henry Cohen explained the 
rationale for judicial control of gateway determinations under the FAA 
Section 4: 
 
[T]he fundamental reason for [judicial resistance was 
that] people were not able to take care of themselves in 
making contracts, and stronger men would take 
advantage of the weaker, and the courts had to come in 
and protect them. … And that is still true to a certain 
extent. … [Therefore a]t the outset the party who has 
refused to arbitrate because he believes in good faith 
that his agreement does not bind him to arbitrate, or that 
the agreement is not applicable to the controversy, is 
protected by the provision of the law which requires the 
court to examine into the merits of such a claim.199   
  
From now on, the presence of clear “delegation” language in arbitration 
agreements will mean that the judicial “gatekeeper” role is limited to 
consideration of defenses specifically aimed at the delegation provision 
itself. Thus, in the presence of a delegation provision (which will, needless 
to say, become ubiquitous), it will be necessary for a party seeking to avoid 
arbitration to demonstrate that the arbitrator selection mechanism is 
unfair—as where the other party has unilateral control over the selection of 
the arbitrators (either through the appointment process or through 
manipulation of the underlying pool of arbitrators), or where there are 
                                                 
199 See David Horton, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 96 
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2010/04/02/horton.pdf. 
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demonstrable conflicts of interest on the part of arbitrators or administrative 
bodies helping with selection.200 A party seeking to avoid arbitration will 
not be able to raise a litany of concerns about other elements of the 
arbitration agreement—those relating to costs, discovery, nature and 
location of hearings, form of award, kinds of remedies, etc.—unless they 
can be shown to have an impact on the validity of the delegation provision. 
This approach significantly further minimizes the judicial policing function 
and places even greater responsibilities on the shoulders of private 
arbitrators who may be called upon to address a variety of fairness issues. 
Judicial intervention in the arbitration process will be largely confined to 
post-award procedures under the limited grounds set forth in the FAA or 
analogous state arbitration statutes—grounds which, as a general principle, 
prohibit courts from inquiring into the merits of arbitral decision-making 
and accord arbitrator discretion significant deference.201          
 While this arrangement will be acceptable—even highly desirable—
in most forms of business-to-business arbitration, it is likely to underline the 
fears of consumer and employee advocates who see Rent-A-Center as a 
dramatic narrowing of the potential range of protection against the threat of 
procedural abuse under arbitration agreements.    
Such advocates are unlikely to draw comfort from Granite Rock Co. v. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,202 published right after Rent-A-Center, 
which restates and reinforces the formalistic approach of that decision.  The Court, 
                                                 
200 See Raquel A. Rodriguez & B. Ted Howes, Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Jackson—Who Is The 
Proper ‘Gatekeeper’ of Arbitrability? Divided Supreme Court Reverses Ninth Circuit in 
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 25 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 1 (July 2010) 
(litigant challenging a delegation provision “must specifically allege that the delegation 
provision itself is fraudulent, the subject of undue influence or duress, or unconscionable”).   
201 See supra note 99 & accompanying text. 
202 Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010). 
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in decision authored by Justice Thomas,203 cites Firsts Options and Rent-A-Center 
in the course of instructing lower courts regarding the “proper framework” for 
handling of arbitrability issues under federal statutes204: 
 
Under that framework, a court may order arbitration of 
a particular dispute only where the court is satisfied that 
the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. To satisfy 
itself that such agreement exists, the court must resolve 
any issue that calls into question the formation or 
applicability of the specific arbitration clause that a 
party seeks to have the court enforce. Where there is no 
provision validly committing them to an arbitrator, 
these issues typically concern the scope of the 
arbitration clause and its enforceability. In addition, 
these issues always include whether the clause was 
agreed to, and may include whether that agreement was 
formed.205     
 
Thomas’ “framework” appears to consciously distinguish questions involving “the 
scope of an arbitration clause or its enforceability,” which he indicates may be 
referable to arbitrators by appropriate (“clear and unmistakable”) agreement, from 
questions about whether the clause was agreed to, or when it was formed. In this 
way Thomas in Granite Rock, like Scalia in Rent-A-Center, appears to be 
                                                 
203 In a 7-2 decision the Court overturned yet another Ninth Circuit decision involving 
arbitration—this in the setting of a labor/management dispute.  The Court held that a 
dispute over a collective bargaining agreement’s ratification date was a matter for the 
District Court, not an arbitrator, to resolve.   
204 Although the decision involves a collective bargaining agreement, Thomas freely mixes 
labor and FAA precedents.   
205 Granite Rock Co., 130 S. Ct. at 2856 (internal citations omitted).   
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conceptually separating questions of bare, formal assent, which are inescapably for 
the courts, from questions about the enforceability or validity of the arbitration 
agreement, which may be allocated to arbitrators (and again, are very likely to be 
so allocated in future standardized contracts of adhesion).         
 Thomas also reminds us that even the “presumption of arbitrability,” 
which reflects the FAA’s “commitment to ‘overrule the judiciary’s longstanding 
refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the 
same footing as other contracts,”206 is subject to the principle of assent that is the 
foundation of arbitration. “Nor,” Thomas’ opinion continues, “have we held that 
courts may use policy considerations as a substitute for party agreement.”207   
On one level, Granite Rock may be read as nothing more than affirmation 
of the “bedrock” principle of assent—and the court’s traditional gateway role in 
policing assent—that is at the heart of the FAA. Seen in the context of current 
Court jurisprudence, however, the announced framework and cautionary dictum on 
policy appear to reflect the Court’s self-described commitment to enforcing 
arbitration agreements according to their formal, literal terms, unfiltered by other 
policies except and to the extent divined by the Court in its reading of the FAA and 
the seemingly inexhaustible wellspring of “federal substantive law.”208      
As the U.S. Supreme Court dramatically limits the judicial oversight 
of arbitration agreements in contracts of adhesion, it is appropriate to view 
its actions against the backdrop of legislative or judicial responses to the 
                                                 
206 Id. at 2859. 
207 Id. 
208 Criticizing Scalia’s rationale in Rent-A-Center (and the general trend of recent decisions 
by the Court), one thoughtful observer of arbitration concluded: 
The Court’s resolution... illustrates the conservative majority’s 
willingness to purport to base its decisions on the precepts of party 
autonomy when it suits the majority’s ideological objective and to 
disregard those same precepts when the majority’s ideological 
objective so requires. 
James M. Gaitis, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson and the Ongoing Assault on 
Party Autonomy, http://www.karlbayer.com/blog/?p=9732 (last visited Nov. 2, 
2010).  
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same concerns in other parts of the world.209 The Court’s continuing 
promotion of arbitration falls in line with the expansive “unfettered market” 
approach to the international economic order that was widely embraced in 
the wake of World War II.210 In Rent-A-Center the U.S. Supreme Court 
dramatically limits the purview of judicial policing of unconscionable 
arbitration agreements by enforcing a delegation clause situating nearly all 
gate keeping functions in the hands of the arbitrator—save defenses relating 
directly to the delegation clause itself.   
As previously stated, the proposition that arbitrators have authority 
to resolve issues relating to their own jurisdiction, including the 
enforceability of the arbitration agreement and related scope questions, is 
generally uncontroversial in the international arena.211 In other jurisdictions 
                                                 
209 See generally, Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. 
Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the 
World?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831 (2002) [hereinafter “Sternlight”]; Christopher R. 
Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and the 
United States, 28 N.C.J. INT’L. & COM. REG. 357 (2003); Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival 
of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341 (2007); BORN, supra note 
99, at 817-829; SÉBASTIEN BESSON & JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET, DROIT COMPARÉ DE 
L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL, (Deutsche Bibliothek, 2002), [hereinafter, POUDRET & 
BESSON], ¶366.  See also Dirk Otto and Omaia Elwan, V(2), in KRONKE HERBERT & 
NACIMIENTO, PATRICIA (EDS.) RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL 
AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 345, 360-61 (2010) 
[hereinafter Otto & Elwan] (“With regard to arbitration agreements, states may either 
prohibit the arbitration of certain consumer disputes entirely or require a specific and 
separate written arbitration agreement that is designed to effectively inform customers that 
they are about to waive recourse to state courts”). 
210 John Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in 
the Post-War Economic Order, 36 INT’L J. 379 (1982) [hereinafter Ruggie]; Dani Rodrik, The 
Global Governance of Trade: As If Development Really Mattered, United Nations 
Development Programme, July 2001, at 14. 
211 Arbitration Act 1996, § 30 (England); UNCITRAL Model Law art. 16; French NCPC art. 
1466; ICC Rules art. 6(2); LCIA Rules art. 23.  For further discussion on this issue see William 
Park, The Arbitrator's Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES, VOL. 
13, (Kluwer Law International, 2006), pp. 55-146; Virginie Colaiuta, The Similarity of Aims in 
the American and French Legal Systems With Respect to Arbitrators' Powers to Determine 
Their Jurisdiction, 13 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 154, pp. 154-166 [hereinafter Colaiuta]. 
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globally, moreover, the concept of class actions does not exist, although 
their equivalent may be achieved by way of multi-party arbitrations or 
through a body acting as a representative for a class of people who have 
been affected by the same issue.212 However, the vast majority of non-U.S. 
jurisdictions have taken steps to protect their consumers and employees,213 
including those jurisdictions that have adopted strong pro-arbitration 
policies. The protection is usually achieved by either proscribing predispute 
arbitration agreements in consumer and employment contracts, or by 
placing certain conditions or limitations on such agreements.214 In many 
cases, courts have applied statutory or common law standards for policing 
fairness in a manner akin to the approaches of many lower federal and state 
courts in the United States.215   
Thus, U.S. Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence makes the 
U.S. less protective of the procedural rights of consumers and employees 
than almost any other jurisdiction in the world. In the words of one 
commentator:  
 
[d]espite the U.S. … [Court’s] statements to the 
contrary, one might be tempted to conclude that there is 
evidence of convergence in most western legal systems 
                                                 
212 Various jurisdictions differ greatly on this point, but most differ procedurally from the 
classic notion of class actions as found in U.S. law.   
213 It is this distinction in the definition of the term ‘commercial’ that has lead to consumer 
and employment protections being stronger in countries outside of the U.S., as most 
jurisdictions outside the U.S. consider such relationships to be non-commercial, whereas, 
in the U.S., they are still considered commercial. See BORN, supra note 99, at 262-264). 
See also, Karen Stewart & Joseph Matthews, Comment, Online Arbitration of Cross 
Border Business to Consumer Disputes, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1136 (2002). 
214 BORN, supra note 99, at 817-829. 
215 Id. at 820.   
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against the enforcement of pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and in favor of 
the maintenance of consumers’ access to state courts for 
the resolution of their disputes. To do so might involve 
concluding that the current situation in the U.S. … is an 
anomaly flowing from a specific statutory instrument 
particular to American federal law.216  
    
Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen do by no means represent the end of the 
debate over arbitration policy and practice in the United States. The 
concerns underlying these decisions have lent significant momentum to 
efforts in Congress to outlaw predispute arbitration agreements in 
consumer, employment and other categories of contracts.217 These efforts 
have already led to the passage of laws significantly limiting the role of 
arbitration in some employment and consumer settings;218 they may 
eventually affect not only the whole spectrum of consumer and employment 
contracts but also the broad realm of business-to-business arbitration.     
     
                                                 
216 Geneviève Saumier, Consumer Arbitration in the Evolving Canadian Landscape, 113 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1203, 1226 (2009). 
217 Beware the Fine Print, NEW YORK TIMES, June 26, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/opinion/27sun2.html?_r=1&ref=supreme_court. 
218 See infra text accompanying notes 226-235.   
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V. THE PENDULUM SWINGS: PENDING U.S. LEGISLATION ON BINDING 
ARBITRATION  
 
A. Mounting Efforts at Reform 
 
For many years the Supreme Court has pursued a course of maximal 
enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements across virtually the whole 
spectrum of civil claims and controversies, including arbitration agreements 
in standardized contracts of adhesion. It has done so in full recognition of 
the ability of Congress to enact contrary legislation, and has drawn attention 
to Congressional inaction in the course of giving full play the discerned 
penumbra of “federal substantive law” surrounding the FAA.219    
Now, Congress and the Executive Branch have taken responsive 
steps reflecting less sanguine views of the operation of arbitration 
provisions. These initiatives reflect the other side of debate, championed by 
some consumer and employee advocates and academics, which focuses on 
real or potential abuses of private justice. The complaints have mounted 
significantly in recent years with the publication of a Public Citizen report 
documenting the unfortunate experiences of individuals in consumer 
arbitration,220 the much-publicized plight of a young rape victim required to 
arbitrate her claims,221 and the Minnesota Attorney General’s allegations of 
                                                 
219 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Richard Nagareda, 
The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670722).   
220 See Public Citizen Report, available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf. 
221 See, e.g., Wade Goodwyn, Rape Case Highlights Arbitration Debate, June 9, 2009, 
available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105153315 (last visited Nov. 4, 
2010). 
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fraud against a provider of consumer credit card arbitration services.222 The 
same concerns have stimulated regular proposals in Congress to limit or 
regulate predispute arbitration agreements. These efforts reached a 
crescendo in the wake of the 2008 election.       
During 2009 and the first half of 2010, Congress proposed over a 
dozen measures addressing the issue of mandatory binding arbitration.223 
These included attempts to limit the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
in very specific categories, such as the Rape Victims Act of 2009,224 which 
would prevent employers, engaged in interstate commerce, from enforcing 
otherwise valid pre-dispute arbitration agreements where the employees suit 
                                                 
222 Joshua Freed, Bank of America Drops Arbitration Requirement, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 
13, 2009), available at 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2009657887_apusbankofameric
aarbitration.html?syndication=bondheads. Firm Agrees to End Role in Arbitrating Card 
Debt, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/business/20credit.html. 
223 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) (invalidating pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in the consumer, employment, franchise, and civil rights 
context); Consumer Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 99, 111th Cong. (2009) (invalidating pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in the consumer context); Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. (2009) (establishing Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau with ability to limit use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements); Fairness 
in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 512, 111th Cong. (2009) (invalidating pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements between long-term care facilities and the elderly); Labor Relations 
First Contract Negotiations Act of 2009, H.R. 243, 111th Cong. (2009) (requiring 
arbitration of initial contract disputes); Payday Loan Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1214, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (listing mandatory unfair arbitration clause as illegal element of loan 
contract); Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices Reduction Act, H.R. 2108, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (invalidating all consumer pre-dispute arbitration agreements); Rape Victims Act of 
2009, S. 2915, 111th Cong. (2009) (invalidating all pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
where the tort alleged was rape); Service Members Access to Justice Act of 2009, H.R. 
1474, 111th Cong. (2009) (invalidating pre-dispute arbitration agreements under 
USERRA); Taxpayer Abuse Prevention Act, S. 585, 111th Cong. (2009) (invalidating pre-
dispute arbitration agreement in contract between lendor and lendee in anticipation of 
income tax return). 
 It is worth noting that many of the anti-arbitration provisions covered in these acts 
would fall under the protected categories listed in the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009. 
Also, a number of the proposed restrictions on lending practices are already covered in the 
recently passed Consumer Protection Act. See infra text accompanying notes 228-235.  
224 Rape Victims Act of 2009, S. 2915, 111th Cong. (2009).  
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alleges rape, and the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, 225 which 
would invalidate all pre-dispute arbitration agreements between long term 
care facilities and their residents.  
Although most of the proposed legislation is still pending, some 
relevant bills have become law. The 2010 Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act (“Defense Act”),226 signed by President Obama in late 
2009, included a provision that prohibits federal contractors who receive 
funds under the Act for contracts in excess of $1,000,000 from requiring 
their employees or independent contractors to arbitrate “claims involving 
Title VII of the civil rights act or any tort arising out of alleged sexual 
assault or harassment.”227  
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Consumer Protection Act”)228 has the potential to effect sweeping reforms 
with regard to mandatory binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the 
broad arenas of consumer finance and investment. Signed into law by 
President Obama on July 21, 2010, the Consumer Protection Act contains 
several different provisions that aim to restrict or to consider possible 
restrictions in the use of predispute arbitration agreements.229 Under the 
provisions of Section 748(n)(1-2) and Section 922, the Act provides special 
                                                 
225 Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 512, 111th Cong. (2009). 
226 See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. § 8116  (2010). 
227 See John J. Roddy, Emerging Perspectives on the Fundamental Fairness of Mandatory 
Arbitration Coupled with Class Action Bans, 1789 PLI/Corp 1105, (Apr 8-9, 2010) at 
1126; Zachary D. Fasman, The New Developments in Employment Class Actions, 833 
PLI/Lit 575, (Sep. 27-28, 2010) at 705.  
228 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th 
Cong. (2010) (“Consumer Protection Act”).  
229 The exception is a provision relating to reinsurance agreements and the rights and duties 
of the ceding insurer. Under §531(b)(1) the state law of the state that is not the domicile 
state of the ceding insurer is preempted if it restricts or eliminates the insurer’s rights to 
contractual arbitration. 
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protections and incentives to whistleblowers.230 An employee cannot waive 
his right to a judicial forum regarding a dispute that arises under the 
whistleblower protection section of the act.231 This prevents an employer 
covered under the section from forcing arbitration of the issue of whether a 
particular employee qualifies for the extensive enumerated protections 
listed under the section.232 Section 1414 amends the Truth in Lending Act to 
provide that no mortgage lender may include a pre-dispute arbitration 
clause in their loan agreements.233     
 The Consumer Protection Act is largely concerned with regulation 
of the newly established Consumer Financial Protections Bureau (“CFPB”). 
Section 1057 provides general whistleblower protection to all employees of 
companies and individuals who fall under the auspices of the CFPB,234 and, 
furthermore, that “no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or 
enforceable to the extent that it requires arbitration of a dispute arising 
under this section.”235 
 
B. The Arbitration Fairness Act 
 
Of all the recent or proposed enactments, however, the most 
sweeping is the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,236 which would prevent 
the use and enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in all 
                                                 
230 Id., §748(n)(1-2) & §922. 
231 Id. 
232 §748(n) adds a whistleblower protection section to the Commodities Exchange Act and 
§ amends Title 18’s pre-existing whistleblower protection section.  Id. § 748(n). 
233 Compare Consumer Protection Act, § 1414(e) with Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. (2010) (noting the absence and presence 
of a prohibition on the enforcement of existing pre-dispute agreements).  
234 Consumer Protection Act at § 1057. 
235 Id. 
236 Arbitation Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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consumer, employment, franchise contracts, and with respect to claims 
under disputes under statutes protecting civil rights. 
There are currently two versions of the Arbitration Fairness Act 
(AFA) in Congress. The House Bill (H.R. 1020)237 is intended to amend 
Section 2 of the FAA to provide that:  
 
(b) No pre-dispute arbitration agreement shall be valid 
or enforceable if it requires arbitration of— 
(1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute; or 
(2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to 
protect civil rights. 
 
(c) An issue as to whether this chapter applies to an 
arbitration agreement shall be determined by Federal 
law. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the 
validity or enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate 
shall be determined by the court, rather than the 
arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting 
arbitration challenges the arbitration agreement 
specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the 
contract containing such agreement.  
 
(d) Nothing in this chapter shall apply to any arbitration 
provision in a collective bargaining agreement.238   
 
                                                 
237 Id.    
238 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009).  
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The Senate version of the bill is very similar, but proposes to incorporate 
modifications to the FAA within a separate new section.239 Both bills 
outlaw predispute arbitration agreements respecting employment, 
consumer, franchise, or statutory civil rights disputes.240   
Ever since the AFA was first introduced in 2007, it has stimulated 
considerable debate among lawyers and scholars.241 Both current bills are 
improvements over the vague language of the now-deceased Arbitration 
                                                 
239 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009) § 3(a) provides as follows:  
(a) In General. Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no 
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it 
requires arbitration of an employment, consumer, franchise, or 
civil rights dispute. 
(b) Applicability. 
(1) In general. An issue as to whether this chapter applies to an 
arbitration agreement shall be determined under Federal law. The 
applicability of this chapter to an agreement to arbitrate and the 
validity and enforceability of an agreement to which this chapter 
applies shall be determined by the court, rather than the arbitrator, 
irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the 
arbitration agreement specifically or in conjunction with other 
terms of the contract containing such agreement. 
(2) Collective bargaining agreements. Nothing in this chapter shall 
apply to any arbitration provision in a contract between an 
employer and a labor organization or between labor organizations, 
except that no such arbitration provision shall have the effect of 
waiving the right of an employee to seek judicial enforcement of a 
right arising under a provision of the Constitution of the United 
States, a State constitution, or a Federal or State statute, or public 
policy arising therefrom. 
240 Both the House and Senate versions include exclusions for collective bargaining, 
although the Senate version provides that even in a collective bargaining situation an 
employee cannot waive any statutory or constitutional rights (an apparent effort to reverse 
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009), holding “that a collective-
bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate 
ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law”). Another major difference in the 
two bills is that the Senate version creates a new, discrete section in the FAA, whereas, the 
House bill acts as an amendment to §2.   
241 See, Shirley M. Hufstedler and William H. Webster, Arbitration under Siege, NAT’L. 
L.J. (Sept. 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202472117839&slreturn=1&hbxlogin
=1. 
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Fairness Act of 2007, which provided for the non-enforceability of disputes 
under "any statute intended to protect civil rights or to regulate contracts or 
transactions between parties of unequal bargaining power."242 The failure to 
provide more specific definition for the classes of affected statutes 
(affecting “civil rights”) creates a grey area of non-enforceability that may 
be exploited by parties seeking to avoid or to delay the commencement of 
arbitration, undermining conventional expectations regarding arbitration's 
efficiency and economy of process.   
This effect is dramatically compounded by a clause providing that 
"the validity or enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate shall be 
determined by the court, rather than the arbitrator…"243 In the House 
version of the AFA this provision applies to any kind of arbitration 
agreement, without regard to the parties' sophistication or the way in which 
the parties struck an agreement to arbitrate. The practical result is to deny 
enforcement to provisions, now ubiquitous in domestic and international 
commercial arbitration procedures that promote efficiency by vouchsafing 
enforcement and "jurisdictional" questions to arbitrators. The impact of this 
provision is rendered far greater by a materially ambiguous provision that 
gives courts initial authority to address not only "challenges [of] the 
arbitration agreement specifically," but also challenges to the arbitration 
provision "in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such 
agreement." This provision undermines the separability principle first 
enunciated in Prima Paint244 treating predispute arbitration agreements are 
separable from the contracts of which they are a part for the purposes of 
assessing their enforceability under the terms of the FAA. While such a 
                                                 
242 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007). 
243 Id. at § 4(c). 
244 See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.   
THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
 
195 
limitation may be appropriate in the context of certain categories of 
contracts, which are normally adhesive, such as employment or consumer 
contracts, it is wholly inconsistent with expectations in the typical business-
to-business setting.245 Professor Emmanuel Gaillard warned that the act 
"pos[es] a serious threat to the promotion of efficient international dispute 
resolution and of the United States as a friendly place to arbitrate."246   
A final concern raised by the AFA is its categorical prohibition of 
arbitration agreements in franchise agreements. While many countries have 
outlawed or restricted the use of predispute arbitration agreements in 
consumer or employment contracts, research has revealed no statutory 
prohibitions or regulations respecting arbitration provisions in franchise 
agreements anywhere else in the world with the exception of Puerto Rico.247 
Thus, where arbitration is readily available to private parties as a mean of 
resolving disputes, no distinction is made with respect to arbitration 
agreements contained in franchise contracts.   
 
C. A More Considered Approach?   
 
A framework for more thoughtful and discrete consideration of the 
operation of arbitration agreements in consumer settings may have been 
                                                 
245 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 
at 35-49. 
246 Emmanuel Gaillard, International Arbitration Law, 2008 N.Y.L.J. 3 at 3.      
247 Even in Puerto Rico, however, there is no outright prohibition on such agreements. The 
Puerto Rico Dealers’ Contracts Act requires that a court, before enforcing an arbitration 
provision in a franchise contract, determine that the provision “was subscribed freely and 
voluntarily by both parties.” P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 278b-3 (1964). Moreover, the law 
creates a rebuttable presumption that any arbitration provision in a franchise contract “was 
included or subscribed at the request of the principal or grantor” and “is an adhesion 
contract to be interpreted and made effective as such.” Getting the deal through, Franchise 
in 33 jurisdictions worldwide, 2009 – Puerto Rico Chapter at p. 150. 
ARBITRATOR AS JUDGE… AND JUDGE OF JURISDICTION SYMPOSIUM 
   
196 
established under certain provisions of the previously mentioned Consumer 
Protection Act.248 Instead of an outright prohibition on predispute 
arbitration agreements, the Act may permit a process of deliberate 
investigation, reflection and debate about the role of arbitration in specific 
settings. Section 1028 of the Act gives the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) broad power to regulate all pre-dispute arbitration contracts 
in the area of consumer financial products and services.249 It is directed to 
study and prepare a report to Congress on the use of predispute arbitration 
agreements “in connection with the offering or providing of consumer 
financial products or services.”250 If deemed to be in the public interest, it 
“may prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use” of such 
agreements.”251 Section 928 provides the Securities and Exchange 
                                                 
248 See Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010).. 
249 Consumer Protection Act at §1028 provides: 
(a) STUDY AND REPORT.--The Bureau shall conduct a study of, 
and shall provide a report to Congress concerning, the use of 
agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute between 
covered persons and consumers in connection with the offering or 
providing of consumer financial products or services. 
(b) FURTHER AUTHORITY.--The Bureau, by regulation, may 
prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an 
agreement between a covered person and a consumer for a 
consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of 
any future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such 
a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the 
public interest and for the protection of consumers. The findings in 
such rule shall be consistent with the study conducted under 
subsection (a). 
(c) LIMITATION.--The authority described in subsection (b) may not 
be construed to prohibit or restrict a consumer from entering into a 
voluntary arbitration agreement with a covered person after a 
dispute has arisen. 
250 Id. at § 1028(a). 
251 Id. at § 1028(b). 
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Commission (“SEC”) with the same power with regards to securities 
products and services.252  
It is hard to predict at this point what if any recommendations will 
result from the CFPB and SEC studies. Especially in the realm of securities 
arbitration, complaints about the system are balanced and perhaps 
outweighed by the track record of programs that have been overseen by the 
SEC and related entities such as the Securities Industry Conference on 
Arbitration.253 Moreover, the passage of the new bill may have encouraged 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) to announce a new 
regulatory proposal to make permanent its pilot “all-public” arbitrator 
program.254 Henceforth, investors will have the opportunity to appoint a 
panel of three arbitrators, none of whom have affiliations with the securities 
industry; the requirement of a single “industry” arbitrator—long a focus of 
complaints by investor advocates—will be eliminated.255   
 
                                                 
252 Id. at § 928. 
253 See Katsoris, supra note 156; Stipanowich, supra note 149.  According to a recent letter 
to Congress by a business coalition assembled by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce:  
Approximately 70 percent of consumer cases arbitrated last year through 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") resulted in a 
recovery for the investor. Studies show that investors fare at least as well in 
arbitration as in court (if not better), and receive their recoveries in far less 
time. In fact, many recent FINRA arbitrations have resulted in awards and 
settlements in the millions of dollars.   
Letter from the Undersigned Members of the Coalition to Preserve Arbitration Opposing 
the Anti-Arbitration Provisions in S. 3217, the "Restoring American Financial Stability Act 
of 2010" (April 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2010/letter-undersigned-members-coalition-
preserve-arbitration-opposing-anti-arbitrat. 
254 See FINRA News Release, FINRA Proposes to Permanently Give Investors the Option 
of All-Public Arbitration Panels (Sept. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2010/P122178. 
255 See id. 
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The Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence under the FAA is an 
extended exercise in shoring up the bulwarks of private, binding dispute 
resolution in furtherance of the presumed intent of contracting parties. 
While its staunchest adherents may insist that the Court’s reticence is 
justified as effectively promoting pro-arbitration policies under the FAA 
(announced and repeatedly reinforced by the Court since the mid-1980s) 
and in requiring lower courts to be measured and precise in the handling of 
defenses, many are now convinced that the Court has not done enough to 
address the problems of arbitration in standardized contracts of adhesion. 
The Court’s most recent decisions, far from alleviating these concerns, have 
pronounced significant new limits on judicial oversight of arbitration 
agreements in the course of further expanding the purview of federal pro-
arbitration policy.   
The Court’s seeming inflexibility is a significant contributor to 
momentum building in Congress for legislation to dramatically restrict the 
use of predispute arbitration agreements in consumer, employment and 
franchise agreements.256 While Congressional efforts to address widespread 
concerns about arbitration agreements in adhesion settings reflect to some 
extent predominant approaches to the protection of consumers and 
employees around the world, they also raise legitimate concerns. In 
particular, the breadth and ambiguity of the Arbitration Fairness Act, and 
                                                 
256 See supra Parts II-IV. 
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the potential impact of the statute on international transactions, is of great 
concern to the international business community.257    
As recent elections have brought about a change in the political 
climate in Washington, an optimistic view might foresee the opportunity for 
thoughtful, relatively dispassionate consideration of the operation of 
arbitration agreements within discrete transactional and relational settings. 
For example, the current initiatives aimed at examining arbitration in the 
context of financial services contracts and agreements between securities 
investors and brokers258 offer the possibility for bringing forth and 
considering relevant data about the costs and benefits of arbitration for 
consumers. The history and evolution of regulated securities arbitration will 
also afford a basis for consideration of that model as an alternative to 
unregulated arbitration, or to outright prohibition of arbitration in such 
settings.259 
Another possible “middle ground” measure would be the 
implementation of minimum due process guidelines for employment or 
consumer arbitration—a notion suggested by various due process standards 
developed under private or quasi-public auspices in the 1990s.260 A 
proposed Model Arbitration Act aimed at establishing due process 
guidelines for employment arbitration is among the alternative concepts 
now being discussed by concerned individuals and groups.261     
 
                                                 
257 See Alan Cooper, Congress is Mulling 'Arbitration Fairness Act': U.S. Chamber, 
Business Groups Are Incensed, VA. LAWYERS WEEKLY, FEB. 26, 2010. 
258 See supra note 250-252 & accompanying text.  
259 See supra note 157 & accompanying text.   
260 See supra notes 150-151. 
261 See Draft Model Arbitration Act (2010) (developed by Lewis Maltby and other scholars 
and arbitration experts, including the author; currently being circulated) (on file with 
author).   
